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Abstract
This essay examines how historians have perceived the role of Gen. Lucius Clay in
the 1961 Berlin Crisis. It analyzes fourteen secondary sources to determine how they
portray General Clay and why they present him as they do. It begins by briefly
recounting the events leading up to the Berlin Crisis and the primary incidents during
1961.

As

much as possible, this version has been completed using the documentary

evidence. Once the facts have been relayed, the essay delves into the content analysis of
these fourteen sources. Finally, the essay argues that the historians who portray Clay in a
more reckless light present a more valid view than those who assert that his actions were
justified and that though action may have been necessary, the steps General Clay took
were dangerously provocative.
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Chapter One - Introduction

"One of the most dangerous confrontations of the Cold War occurred in late October
1961 when, for the first and only time, U.S. and Soviet tanks squared off against each
other .... The world came closer than ever to a nuclear-age equivalent of the Wild West
showdown at the OK Corral." 1 This is how Raymond Garthoff describes the Checkpoint
Charlie incident. He believes the incident and, specifically, the actions taken by Gen.
Lucius Clay brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of war, and a
number of Cold War historians share this view. Not all scholars portray General Clay's
efforts during the Checkpoint Charlie incident and its related events in the Berlin Crisis
as Garthoff does. Some historians portray Clay as the hero. This essay will explore these
varying interpretations of General Clay and the 1961 Berlin Crisis to determine why
these historians developed their views of Clay as they did and discern which portrayal of
Clay is more valid.
As World War II began drawing to a close in 1944, the soon-to-be victorious Allied
Powers - the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain - outlined military
occupation plans for Germany. They divided Germany into four zones: the Soviet Union
would control the eastern section, and the western portion would consist of three zones,
the U.S., Great Britain, and France each controlling one of the zones. Berlin, which lay

1

Raymond Garthoff, "Berlin 1961: The Record Corrected," Foreign Policy (Fall 1991),
142.

2
deep in the Soviet sector, would also be apportioned in this manner. The Allies intended
this division to be temporary, but it would remain Germany's reality for decades. 2
In the years following World War II, ideological and economic differences between
the Western Allies and the Communist Soviet Union gave birth to the Cold War. The
Allies disagreed on reparation agreements and unification terms for Germany, and both
the Soviets and the West feared a unified Germany under the control of the other power.
The Western Allies began to consolidate their zones and integrate western Germany into
Western Europe. In 1948 the Soviets cut off traffic between western Germany and
western Berlin, which forced the Americans, led by Gen. Lucius Clay, and their allies to
airlift supplies to the stranded Berliners. The next year east and west Germany created
their own governments, becoming the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRO) respectively. Both states gained more sovereignty
from their assigned occupied powers over the next few years. 3
By 1958 nearly four million East Germans had fled to the West since the end of the
war. Most of these were young, skilled workers, which led to a severe decline in
production and other economic problems for the east. Many of the refugees traveled
2

U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1985), 1-3, 6-11.
3
Ibid., 117-23, 135-39, 221, 257, 306-09. For further discussion of the European context
of the Cold War, see Lynn Etheridge Davis, The Cold War Begins: Soviet-American
Conflict over Eastern Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); John Lewis
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National
Security Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Melvyn Leffler, A
Preponderence of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold
War, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line:
The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49, (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1996); and Frank Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy: A Study in German-American
Relations, 1961-63, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
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through Berlin, and Walter Ulbricht, head of the Communist Party in East Germany,
began to pressure Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev for permission to close the border.
Khrushchev refused and instead issued a deadline to the Western powers: sign a peace
treaty with both German states and end all occupation of Berlin in six months. If they
refused to comply, the Soviet Union would transfer all its authority in Berlin to the GDR.
If the Western allies refused to acknowledge the GDR's sovereignty in Berlin, the Soviet
Union would be forced to defend the GDR' s rights - militarily if necessary. 4
Khrushchev eased his pressure on the West after making a personal connection with
President Dwight Eisenhower at Camp David in September 1959. He then renewed the
deadline after unproductive talks with President John Kennedy at the Vienna Conference
in June 1961. Meanwhile, terrified East Germans continued to flee to West Germany
through Berlin in search of better living conditions. That month alone 20,000 people left,
and in July 30,000 more fled. 5
In August 1961 the East German Communists erected the Berlin Wall to stop the flow
of refugees fleeing to the West by way of Berlin. The people of West Germany and West
Berlin became greatly distressed, and their morale plummeted. They expected the
Americans, who still occupied Berlin, to prevent the Communists from talcing such
measures. To reassure the Germans and prove that the United States had not forgotten
them, President John Kennedy sent Vice President Lyndon Johnson and Gen. Lucius
4

Honore Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision
Making, (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag, 1980), 48; Documents on Germany, I 944-I 985, 542-46.
5
Documents on Germany, I 944-1985, 676-83, 684-85; U.S. Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United States, The Berlin Crisis, 1961-1963, (Washington, D.C.,
I 994), (hereafter cited as FRUS), 95, 97-98; Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall
Crisis, 184-85.
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Clay to Berlin. General Clay was a hero to the West Berliners because he oversaw the
1948-49 Berlin airlift, which supplied West Berlin with food and coal during the Soviet
imposed blockade. 6
Clay's initial trip to Berlin at the end ofAugust was a great success. He and Johnson
restored some ofthe Berliners' confidence in American commitment. To preserve and, if
possible, increase this morale, Kennedy sent Clay back to Berlin as his special
representative. Clay returned to Berlin once again as a symbol ofAmerican commitment,
to demonstrate American resolve and determination to protect the freedom of West
Berlin. 7
As General Clay's first step in cementing Berlin morale, he ordered U.S. forces to
patrol the autobahn, which ran across East Gennany from West Berlin to West Germany.
Earlier that month the East German police began harassing U.S. and other allied
personnel traveling on that road. The Soviets protested Clay's action and blocked the
patrols. Clay responded by sending a convoy ofmilitary vehicles to replace the patrols,
and the East Germans soon ended the harassment. 8
Clay's next step to boost West Berlin's morale concerned the village ofSteinstucken.
Although a small strip ofEast German territory separated the� Steinstucken was part of
6

Documents on Germany 1944-1985, 752, 763, 773-77; Howard Trivers, Three Crises
in American Foreign Affairs and a Continuing Revolution, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1972), 31; Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate,
Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1961), 781; FRUS, The Berlin Crisis, 1961-1963, 333. For further discussion ofthe
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Berlin in the Balance, 1945-1949, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, I 998), 210, 255-58,
299-300.
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Jean Edward Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life, (New York, 1990), 655.
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West Berlin. East German police's harassment of the villagers only intensified after the
wall's construction. Clay ordered two companies of troops to enter the village to protect
it from the East Germans. Gen. Bruce Clarke, commander of U.S. forces in Europe,
discovered Clay's scheme and aborted the mission. Undeterred, Clay flew by helicopter
to the village and rescued some East Berlin refugees who fled to Steinstucken after the
border closed. Some of the East German Volkspolizei (Vopos or People's Police) turned
their guns on the helicopter but fired no shots.9
The most potentially dangerous situation General Clay faced in Berlin came with the
tank standoff between American and Soviet forces at the Friedrichstrasse crossing or
Checkpoint Charlie. On Sunday October 22, the East German Vopos refused to allow
Allan Lightner, head of the U.S. mission in Berlin, to travel into East Berlin without
presenting identification, even though his vehicle carried a U.S. occupation license plate,
which had previously served as identification enough. When informed of the situation,
Clay ordered four U.S. M-48 tanks to the border crossing and a military escort for
Lightner's car. When attempting to cross with his military escort, Lightner proceeded
unimpeded. After a discussion between the American and Soviet political advisers, in
which Soviet Major Lazerev apologized and assured the American political adviser
Howard Trivers, who was in charge of the Eastern Affairs Section in the U.S. Mission in
Berlin, that the Vopos had failed to clear their actions with the Soviets, Lightner crossed
the border once more - this time without need of a military attendants. 10

9

Norman Gelb, The Berlin Wall: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and a Showdown in the Heart of
Europe, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1986), 248-49.
10
FRUS, The Berlin Crisis, 1961-1963, 524.
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The scene repeated on October 25 when General Clay attempted to send another
allied vehicle across the border. The morning after the first incident, the East German
government issued a decree, stating that all allied personnel not wearing a uniform would
have to present identification. This time the Soviets asserted that the East Gennans did
nothing wrong in this action and that the U.S. would have to comply. When the Vopos
stopped the American vehicle, Clay sent ten tanks and more armed guards to the crossing.
Accompanied by military personnel, the vehicle encountered no opposition. 11
Soviet and American representatives met once again but failed to reach an agreement.
On Friday the Soviets brought ten tanks of their own to the crossing in response to
another of Clay's probes, which Clay took as a sign that the Soviets were in charge of the
situation on the eastern side and would not let the East Germans provoke a bigger crisis.
Clay ordered the ten remaining U.S. tanks in Berlin to the checkpoint, and the Soviets
matched them exactly. The next morning the Soviet tanks began to withdraw, and Clay
soon followed suit, believing he had successfully demonstrated U.S. and allied
commitment to Berlin. 12
With these three incidents - the autobahn patrols, Steinstucken, and Checkpoint
Charlie - General Clay took actions that some of his contemporaries and later historians
labeled as reckless and very dangerous. Clay, however, believed that those steps were
necessary and that the United States needed an immediate response of force to prevent a
larger risk of war. He feared the Soviets might push the United States into war unless the

11

Gelb, The Berlin Wall, 252; Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 139-45, 165;
FRUS, The Berlin Crisis, 1961-1963, 537.
12
FRUS, The Berlin Crisis, 1961-1963, 537-39; Smith, Lucius D. Clay, 661.
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U.S. forces made it "clearly evident" that they had "reached the danger point." He also
had another motive for wanting quick U.S. action. "The reason I took these actions was
to restore Berlin morale," Clay later stated. ''Not that I expected these actions in
themselves to achieve any miracles. But I wanted the people of Berlin to know that we
weren't afraid, that we were willing to prove that we were not afraid by taking these
actions. " 13
Clay believed it was vital to American Cold War interests for the people of West
Germany and, especially, West Berlin to believe in American commitment. The United
States had promised to protect the freedom of the democratic West Berlin, which sat
squarely in the heart of Communist East Germany. This was indeed a promise the United
States needed to keep in order to preserve confidence in democracy throughout the world.
How to keep that promise-where, when, and in what manner to defend West Berliners
and allied rights-is where Washington officials and those in Berlin, including General
Clay, differed in their views.
This essay will argue that General Clay was reckless in his attempts to protect West
Berliners and preserve Western rights. In his efforts to demonstrate U.S. military
strength and its courage to stand up to the Soviets, General Clay went beyond the role
assigned to him by Kennedy. With the Checkpoint Charlie incident in particular, he
chose a fight that Kennedy and his administration never wanted. They had little concern
for Western access to East Berlin. Clay also provoked dangerous conflicts over these
issues he believed to be so important with the measures he took to demonstrate U.S.

13

PRUS, The Berlin Crisis. 1961-1963, 511; Smith, Lucius D. Clay.. 656.
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commitment and strength. The manner in which Clay wanted to prove his point often
pushed the situation closer to war than was really necessary for a successful resolution.
The historians in this study differ in their views of whether General Clay was right or
reckless during the Berlin Crisis. Some of these opinions are based on their personal
experiences. A number of the historians were involved in the Berlin Crisis. John
Ausland, who wrote Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis, 1961-1964
(1996), served on the Berlin Task Force during the Kennedy administration. His
discussion of General Clay and the events comes mainly from his own recollections. The
same is true for Theodore Sorensen in Kennedy (1965). He draws from his experience as
"special counsel"' to President John Kennedy. Howard Trivers actively participated in the
Checkpoint Charlie incident, negotiating with his Soviet counterpart. He recounts these
exchanges and other details in Three Crises in American Foreign Affairs and a
Continuing Revolution (1972). Geoffrey McDermott played a role similar to that of
Trivers. In Berlin: Success of a Mission? (1963), McDermott discusses his experience as
the British Minister in Berlin.
Two other authors also participated in government during the Berlin Crisis. William
Smyser served as an assistant to Clay in Berlin. He, however, does not rely merely on his
memories. He thoroughly researches documents, including recently released Soviet and
East German sources, and conducts interviews for From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War
Struggle Over Germany (1999). Raymond Garthoff served in the State Department in
1961, but the crucial sources for his 1991 article, "Berlin 1961: The Record Corrected/'
were interviews conducted by a Russian television station of former Soviet officials.

9

Because these authors were involved with the Berlin Crisis, they may have a
perspective different from scholars and observers who were not involved. They may
have had an agenda in writing their accounts, a point they wanted to prove. This,
however, could be said of even the most highly trained historian. While it is important to
recognize the possibility of biases in these interpretations, that does not discount the story
they have to tell, nor does it make them any less valuable for this study.
Four other works in this study that have the potential for being biased are biographies.
Sorensen would also fit into this category with his examination of Kennedy's presidency.
Richard Reeves also recounts Kennedy's term in President Kennedy: Profile of Power
(1993). John Gearson provides a non-American look at the crisis with his work on the

British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis,
1958-1962: The Limits oflnterests and Force (1998). As expected in a study of one
man's role in a specific crisis, one of the authors provides a biography of General Clay.
Jean Smith profiles General Clay in Lucius D. Clay: An American Life (1990).
The remaining works in this study are strictly historical accounts. Michael Beschloss
discusses Kennedy's relationship with Khrushchev in The Crisis Years: Kennedy and
Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (1991). Peter Wyden focuses on the Berlin Crisis in Wall: The
Inside Story of Divided Berlin (1989). Norman Gelb does this as well in The Berlin
Wall: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and a Showdown in the Heart of Europe (1986). Before he
wrote a biography of Clay, Smith published The Defense of Berlin (1963). Eleanor
Lansing Dulles examines American policy before and after the Berlin Wall in The Wall:
A Tragedy in Three Acts (1972). Curtis Cate wrote The Ides of August: The Berlin Wall
Crisis, 1961 (1978).

10
These fourteen accounts of General Clay and the 1961 Berlin Crisis are analyzed in
this study. The first chapter is a content analysis of these fourteen works, examining
what these historians say about Clay and the individual incidents, how they say it, and
why. The final chapter argues that the negative portrayal of Clay is more valid than the
positive portrayal because General Clay pushed the bounds of his prescribed role in
Berlin and risked dangerous confrontations to prove his points about Western occupation
rights in Berlin in 1961.

11

Chapter Two - The Interpretations: How Historians Perceived
Those Events
When it comes to Gen. Lucius Clay's involvement in the 1961 Berlin Crisis,
historians disagree on how positive a role he played. Some scholars portray Clay in a
very negative light. They argue that he caused more problems than he solved and risked
war with the Soviet Union over minor issues. Other historians draw the opposite
conclusion. They believe Clay made the right decisions when the Soviets and GDR
created conflict. They assert that the stands Clay took in Berlin were of the utmost
significance - indeed the entire Cold War may have hinged on the outcome of these vital
events. This chapter explores these differing interpretations in order to determine why
historians have portrayed General Clay as they have.
Historians with a negative opinion of Clay discuss the complications caused by his
presence in Berlin. John Ausland, who served on the Berlin Task Force during the
Kennedy administration, asserts in Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis
1961- 1964 that Clay made the situation in Berlin "more difficult." Although Ausland
recognized the need for a symbol such as Clay to demonstrate U.S. commitment and
understood Kennedy's position, he argues that Kennedy sending Clay as his "personal
representative" confused matters of responsibility and superiority. The command
structure was already complex enough. Ausland describes it, stating:
The senior American in Berlin was Major General Albert Watson, the commandant.
Watson reported in his political capacity to Ambassador Walter Dowling in Bonn and
in his military capacity to General Bruce Clarke, commander of the United States
army in Europe, with headquarters in Heidelberg. Clarke, in turn, reported to General
Lauris Norstad, United States commander in chief in Europe and supreme allied
commander for Europe. The United States, United Kingdom, and France had also
given Norstad special responsiblities regarding contingencies that might arise

12
regarding Berlin. That accounted for only the military side of the house. There was
also a State Department Mission in Berlin, which was headed by Allan Lightner.
Technically, Lightner reported both to General Watson and to Ambassador Dowling
in Bonn. In addition, however, he communicated directly with the State
Department. 14
In addition to confounding the process of giving and receiving orders, Clay's arrival
soon brought confusion over policy. Ausland argues that Clay's approach to the Soviets
and the Berlin Crisis differed from his commander-in-chief. "Clay believed in action
backed by power, and Kennedy believed in a dialogue backed by power," Ausland states.
Clay remained convinced that the United States needed to be strong in its actions because
the Soviets would understand and respect - or, better yet, fear - that type of behavior.
Kennedy still worried about war by miscalculation and escalation. Clay also felt that
Americans in Berlin had little need of coordinating their policies and actions with their
allies. According to Ausland, Clay "maintained that, if the United States led, the allies
would follow." In Ausland's account, Clay is more of a headache than a real danger. 1 5
In Kennedy. Theodore Sorensen recounts the presidency of John F. Kennedy from his
experience as "special counsel" to the president. He asserts that General Clay's actions
only worsened the tension over the Berlin Crisis. Sorensen presents Clay as seen by
many of his contemporaries in Washington - mainly, difficult. 1 6
Sorensen goes a bit further than Ausland who maintained that Clay "complicated"
matters in Berlin. Sorensen asserts that Clay was "a constant spur to Allied effort" and

14

John Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis 1961-1964, (Boston:
Scandinavian University Press, 1996), 36.
15
Ibid., 30-31.
16
Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), 595.
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"something of an alarmist in his private cables." He states that Clay sent Kennedy
telegrams in which he hinted that "he might resign unless his requests were granted." He
also argues that Kennedy grew frustrated ''with Clay's failure to distinguish our 'vital
rights' in West Berlin from our grievances in East Berlin." Sorensen admits, however,
that Kennedy appreciated the difficult position in which he had placed Clay, especially
considering the general was a Republican. Kennedy also "fully understood the General's
tendency at times to act without waiting for unanimity in his instructions from
Washington, General Norstad and Allied representations in Berlin." In Sorensen's
account, Clay's tendency to be a problem outweighed his value as a "beloved symbol." 1 7
Like Sorensen, Michael Beschloss mentions in The Crisis Years that Clay threatened
to resign a number of times. He also discusses National Security Adviser McGeorge
Bundy's feelings about ClayJ how Bundy found Clay "difficult." Beschless asserts that
because Clay could be so difficult to handle, Kennedy consented to Clay's plan during
the Checkpoint Charlie incident only because he felt "reluctant to provoke the General." 1 8
Peter Wyden also expresses in Wall the opinions of White House staffers who, he
argues, "feared the general's aggressive ways." Wyden pays special attention to the
concerns of"the steely Mac Bundy," who warned Kennedy that he should try to avoid
another conflict like the one between President Harry Truman and Gen. Douglas
MacArthur. Clay also had to contend with the other American generals in Europe.

17

Sorensen, Kennedy, 595.
Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963, (New
York: Harper Collins, 1991), 333.
18

14

Wyden asserts that the generals viewed Clay as a "co.cky hybrid." They no longer saw
him as one oftheir own. He had adopted civilian ways. 1 9
Wyden's source for the American generals' opinions ofClay appear to have come
from his own communication with General Clarke. Ifthis is the case, then Wyden
accepts Clarke as speaking for all the American generals in Europe without providing any
other evidence that they all shared Clarke's assessment ofClay and the situation. Just a
few paragraphs later, Wyden argues that "the fiercest resistance against [Clay's] private
agenda came from his erstwhile cronies in the United States military establishment." He
then discusses General Clarke countermanding Clay's orders for a "practice wall" and
troops marching into Steinstucken, but he offers no other examples ofthese "cronies"
opposing Clay. The only other general mentioned is Watson, to whom Clay gave his
orders, but Wyden provides no evidence that Watson disagreed with Clay's measures. 20
Not only does Wyden portray Clay as "difficult," but he also presents Clay as a Ione
cowboy-like figure with his own agenda. He argues that Kennedy sent Clay to Berlin to
boost morale and that Clay deviated from that order in favor of his own wishes. "Clay
decided that his prime mission was to slap down the Soviets," Wyden states.21

19

Peter Wyden, Wall: The Inside Story ofDivided Berlin, (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1989), 264.
20
Wyde� Wall, 264-65, 698. Wyden' s notes on his sources do not clearly show what
information came from which source. He does not use endnotes or footnotes but lists the
page numbers and the last two words ofa paragraph, making it difficult to determine the
corresponding sources for the information other than direct quotations. This could be due
to the fact that Wyden's work appears to have been written for a more general audience
rather than very scholarly examination.
21
Ibid., 265.
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Wyden provides no clear source on how he determined what Clay really thought
about his mission. It appears as though Wyden may have developed his opinion from his
communication with General Clarke and his interpretation of other secondary sources he
cites, those works by Norman Gelb and Honore Catudal discussed later in this essay.
Wyden does not, however, cite Clay's papers or any conversation or interview with the
general on what Clay believed. Wyden presents his opinion of Clay's motivation as fact
without providing any real evidence to substantiate his claim that he understood the
workings of General Clay's mind. 22
Richard Reeves shares Wyden's view that Clay had his own agenda in Berlin.
According to Reeves, Clay's efforts to force the Soviets to respect Western rights made
many officials in Washington nervous. They worried Kennedy made a grave mistake by
sending Clay to such a precarious situation in Berlin. Reeves argues that "some thought
Kennedy had unwillingly and unwittingly put the question of war and peace into the
hands of a man he barely knew. Clay was taking hard-line chances with the peace of the
world, willing to risk most anything to crush the Soviets."23
Norman Gelb makes this point as weli stating that Clay was a ''wild card." He
argues that Clay went to Berlin with a mistaken idea of his purpose. Kennedy intended
his return to be more of a symbolic gesture, but Clay believed Kennedy sent him abroad
to whip the Berlin mission into shape. Gelb quotes ambassadors, members of the State

22

Wyden, Wall, 698.
Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1 993), 250-51.

23

16
Department, and other Washington officials who worried that Clay would worsen an
already tense situation with the Soviets, a situation Washington had been trying to ease. 24
Gelb asserts that Clay overstepped his bounds in Berlin and caused potentially deadly
problems for Washington and the Berlin mission. In Gelb's view, the issues with which
Clay concerned himself mattered only to Clay. Clay' s presence in Berlin only worsened
matters and made the situation even more dangerous. Gelb argues that "the White House
and the State Department had been trying to fix on a way to signal Moscow that the
United States, while standing firm, wanted to tone down the level tension in Berlin. . . .
Yet here was Clay stirring things up. "25
British historian John Gearson argues in Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall
Crisis, 1 958- 1 962 that Clay only worsened the tension of the Berlin Crisis. He states that
Clay "could be abrasive" and that Macmillan strongly dis liked the general. He quotes
Macmillan who stated: "He seems to me a public danger. He was always an ass: now he
is an embittered ass." Macmillan wanted to ask Kennedy to recall Clay, but his advisors
suggested a less direct approach. Macmillan "expressed British concerns about Clay to
the new U.S. ambassador in London, David Bruce . . . to no avail . . . and the retired
general remained in Berlin and periodically irritated the British and French in the city."26
Historians who view Clay in a more positive light see Clay' s actions as necessary.
Clay was not the problem, they argue, rather the fault lay with Washington. In one of the

24

Norman Gelb, The Berlin Wall: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and a Showdown in the Heart
of Europe, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1 986), 246-47.
25
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17
first published historical accounts of the October incident, The Defense of Berlin, Jean
Edward Smith's argues that Clay had to take control of the Berlin situation because
Washington was indecisive. He asserts that the further an official was from Berlin,
whether in Washington or London, the more anxious that person became; those people
who were in Berlin and witnessed events firsthand remained calm. 27
Smith argues that Clay firmly believed the United States needed to assert itself in the
face of a Communist threat, just as he had concluded in 1948 during the Berlin Blockade.
He remained convinced that the only way to save allied prestige was to force the
Communists to back down. He felt assured that the Soviets and the rest of the world
would interpret the United States's refusal to meet the challenge as surrend':r.28
Smith blames Washington for the Communist attempts to infringe upon allied rights.
Even prior to the building of the wall, the East Germans tried to push the West out of
Berlin, and they succeeded in increments and probably would have accomplished their
goal. Fortunately (in Smith's eyes) for the West, Kennedy sent General Clay to Berlin,
and he prevented the Communists from destroying the city's four-power status. Smith
chastises Washington for its "timidity" and failure to recognize the necessity of Clay's
decisions. He states that Washington was "extremely jittery" and that even Pentagon
officials participated in "anguished hand-wringing." Smith argues that only Clay's
determination prevented the United States from giving in to East German demand. 29

27

Jean Edward Smith, The Defense of Berlin, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).
Smith, The Defense of Berlin, 321.
29
Ibid., 322-24.
28
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Eleanor Lansing Dulles argues in The Wall: A Tragedy in Three Acts (1972) that the
United States mishandled events of the Berlin Crisis after the construction of the Berlin
Wall. She maintains that it damaged the United States's image in Europe. Dulles argues
that America's "slow, hesitant" reaction to the Berlin Wall greatly hurt American
credibility and West German and Berlin morale. For the first time since 1948, the West
ceded a piece of territory, East Berlin, to the Communists. She states the exact moment
of this cessation remains questionable. It could be July 25 when Kennedy announced that
the United States would protect only West Berlin or August 13 when the West allowed
the wall to remain standing. In any case, according to Dulles, the Communists learned
from these incidents. They realized there was room to maneuver on the Berlin issue. If
they took the initiative and made a bold move, there was a good chance the U.S. might
acquiesce as they had on August 13 . After the West in effect gave the GDR the right to
put up the wall and manage the affairs of East Berlin, East German authorities soon
began testing and probing "to see how far they could push their new found authority." In
Dulles's view, General Clay managed to salvage some of that prestige. 30
Howard Trivers asserts in Three Crises in American Foreign Affairs and a Continuing
Revolution that the Soviets provoked many of the crises of the Kennedy years because of
their low estimation of Kennedy and his administration in light of the Bay of Pigs fiasco
and Kennedy's poor performance at Vienna. Clay's efforts convinced the Soviets to back
off from confrontations in Berlin. Trivers argues that officials in Washington made the
U.S. mission in Berlin much more difficult than it should have been. He felt Washington
30
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took too long in responding to the Berlin Wall and their reaction was too weak. The
Berlin Mission urged "deterrent countenneasures," but the administration ignored their
recommendations. Trivers does not enumerate any examples of these countermeasures.
He discusses the "tit-for-tat" diplomacy and how "deterrent countermeasures" would go a
step beyond that "to deter the Communists from taking further actions which might lead
to a dangerous confrontation." Then he asserts that no action was taken because many
government officials believed the wall would ease the situation. He states, "It was
exceedingly difficult to make the Kennedy administration see beyond its abstract
preconceptions and come to understand the actual situation in West Berlin."3 1
In his biography of Clay, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life, Jean Smith asserts that
the Berlin situation was very precarious. "An immediate show of force was required to
restore confidence in American leadership," Smith contends. "The entire Western
position in Germany - the fruits of 1 5 years of hard work against bitter odds - threatened
to come unraveled." Smith believes that Clay was the only man who could accomplish
this task. Smith demonstrates this idea when discussing Clay's trip to Berlin with Vice
President Johnson. Smith states: "Clay stood in the background. Then the Berliners
caught sight of him, and the cheering became even greater. Ordinary citizens looked at
one another and nodded knowingly. General Clay would not be here, they seemed to say,
unless everything was going to be all right. "32
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Smith contends that officials in Washington made Clay's job very difficult. He
quotes Clay who asserted that he tried to go through the regular chain ofcommand in the
State Department, but they kept referring him to the president. Clay stated: "I always
tried to go through [Secretary ofState Dean] Rusk. And Rusk almost invariably would
say, ' Well, I agree with you, but you call the President and tell him' . . . . Whenever
something serious occurred, no one wanted to make a decision. They all wanted me to
talk to the President." Smith implies that these Washington officials were too timid to
make a decision without considering that their reluctance might be due to the ambiguous
nature ofClay 's appointment. He was the president's "special representative." Kennedy
never outlined where Clay fell in the diplomatic or military chain ofcommand. Perhaps
these officials simply were not sure he needed to clear his decisions with them before
speaking with the president. 33
Also, according to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, after the disastrous Bay ofPigs
invasion in April 1961, President Kennedy was much less willing to trust other people's
opinions. "What ultimately came out of this," Robert Kennedy said, '4was that [President
Kennedy] never substituted anybody else's judgment for his own. The second think is
that, whenever a problem or question came up, he went into the facts minutely." 34
Smith never really offers any possible explanations for Washington's behavior.
Instead he discusses how it presented a problem for Clay because he worried Kennedy
would become aggravated. Clay states: "It's fine to say that you have the right [to talk
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directly to the president]. But you don't utilize the right, or you soon would outwear your
welcome. It had to be a pretty serious matter before I called the President. "35
The president, according to Smith, viewed Clay differently than many members in the
State and Defense Departments. They worried Clay would complicate matters in Berlin
and worsen the already tense situation. Smith stresses that Kennedy, on the other hand,
had every confidence in Clay. They had an understanding. "Kennedy admired Clay's
advocacy and decisiveness: his ability to move swiftly through bureaucratic resistance,"
Smith asserts. "Clay appreciated the President's willingness to take responsibility and
make tough decisions." It is unclear how Smith knows what Kennedy thought of Clay.
He provides no citations of statements or interviews from Kennedy or anyone close to
him. It may be based upon how Clay believed Kennedy felt about him.36
William R. Smyser presents a similarly positive view of Clay in From Yalta to Berlin:
The Cold War Struggle over Germany. He asserts that Clay realized the wall was just one
more pressure point in the Berlin Crisis, but many in Washington believed the wall ended
the crisis. Clay believed the Communists would continue to move against allied rights
and that the U.S. must stop them. In Smyser's view, Clay corrected surmised that the
Soviets worried about escalation as much as, or more than, the United States. This
concern prevented any danger of war over a confrontation in Berlin. This realization
separated Clay and the Washington officials. Smyser suggests that Clay understood the
Soviets much better than the State or Defense Departments did.37
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Smyser asserts that Clay's experience with the Soviets after World War II prepared
him for a return in 1961. He had a unique perspective and understood how the Soviets
and Germans viewed American actions, especially their responses to Communist
provocation. In Smyser's telling, Clay recognized the damage to West Berlin morale that
resulted from the United States standing by and doing nothing while East German police
shot desperate refugees trying to flee. Smyser agrees with Clay that if this continued
much longer, the West Berliners would "begin to recognize who was in charge."38
Smyser argues that Clay understood Khrushchev and the Soviets better than did
Kennedy's advisers and, therefore, knew the proper way to deal with them. Clay
remained confident that Khrushchev wanted a war even less than Kennedy did and would
do everything in his power to prevent causing one. Clay decided that in order for the
United States to make Khrushchev fear escalation, it must become unpredictable. The
United States needed to act more forcefully than merely sending protest notes. Smyser
accepts Clay's interpretation, stating that Clay realized that "if Khrushchev believed that
he and Ulbricht could control the temperature of the Berlin Crisis, he would keep it
bubbling. But if Khrushchev feared it boiling over, he would turn off the heat. "39
Smyser also addresses a topic that many of the historians who portrayed Clay
negatively discuss: his ''threats" to resign. In Smyser's telling, these ''threats" become
merely "hints" and were quite justified. Smyser quotes a letter written by Clay to
President Kennedy in which Clay states that he had no desire to harm Kennedy's
administration and if Kennedy felt Clay was no longer useful, he would leave Berlin at
38
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once. Clay had very particular ideas about what actions were necessary to restore West
Berlin morale. According to Smyser, if Washington continued to undermine Clay's
efforts, morale would never improve and Clay's presence in Berlin indeed served no
purpose. He might as well go home. 40
In his Berlin: Success ofa Mission?, Geoffrey McDermott, who served as the British
Minister in Berlin from July 1961 to June 1962, shares Clay's view that the West needed
to take action against the GDR's harassment. He argues that "the lack ofany effective
reaction from the West to the wall's construction allowed the East Germans to become
"cock-a-hoop." Their success in building the wall inspired the Germans to begin "to
indulge in everything from pinpricks like tossing tear gas bombs over the Wall to the
most brutal outrages against their fellow-citizens who tried to escape to freedom." He
states that General Clay was right in giving the East Germans "a jolt" and in trying to
"expose the futility of the official Soviet line" that East Berlin served as the capital of an
"independent GDR." McDermott asserts that Clay also correctly surmised "the Russians
were not prepared to go to war over . . . Berlin. "4 1
One ofthe incidents Clay used to demonstrate allied commitment was the autobahn
patrols. However, ofthe negative-portrayal American historians, only Gelb discusses the
resumption ofthe patrols along the autobahn. Gelb merely mentions Clay's orders and
tells nothing ofthe Soviets' reaction or how Washington later ended the patrols against
Clay's advisement. This is curious because that example would have provided further
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evidence for Gelb's argument that Washington wanted to ease tension between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union while Clay provoked conflict.42
The only other negative-portrayal historian to discuss the autobahn patrols is Gearson,
who writes about Macmillan. Gearson asserts that "Macmillan had come to accept the
need to insist on core Western rights in Berlin," but "questions such as the de facto
recognition of the [GDR] . . . seemed less important to him and repre sented concessions
easily given in return for a Berlin settlement." The American tendency to act unilaterally
without informing their allies particularly upset the British. Gearson specifically
mentions the armed convoys along the autobahn, which "the British consistently
criticized" as being ''provocative.,,43
The "positive-portrayal" historians mention the patrols more often than their negative
counterparts. Smith first broaches the subject in The Defense ofBerlin. He asserts that
Clay ordered the patrols to stop East German interference with American traffic. He
quotes Clay: "We are in Berlin by right of victory and we propose to maintain the right of
access on the ground." Smith states that Clay succeeded in ending the harassment but
that Washington remained unconvinced. According to Smith, the lack of support from
Washington persuaded Soviet Marshal Koniev to demand the patrols cease, and
Washington complied. Smith argues that with this action, "another chance for a tactical
victory was surrendered. "44
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Curtis Cate asserts in The Ides of August that Kennedy himself encouraged the
Soviets to protest the patrols in a September 25 speech. Kennedy never mentioned the
Berlin Wall nor even hinted "that certain fundamental Four-Power guarantees had been
violated by its construction." Cate argues that the West Berliners and West Germans felt
betrayed and that the Soviets believed they had found a weakness they could exploit. In
Cate's view, Kennedy's speech "emboldened'' the Soviets, convincing them that
Washington would yield to their demands, and Washington promptly proved them
correct. "What [Clay] had achieved . . . was destroyed at one stroke," Cate states. "He
,
was back to square 1. ,4s
Smith also portrays Washington officials negatively for undermining Clay's decisions
and authority in his biography of Clay. Wanting to present Clays' point of view, Smith
asks him if he believed the autobahn access to Berlin was in danger. Clay replied: "It
very definitely was . . . I think [sending convoys along the route] was a damn foolish
thing to stop." According to Smith, Washington never realized the significance of actions
such as patrols or the importance of proving to the Berliners that the United States was
not afraid to stand up to the Communists.46
Smyser argues that Clay's efforts to stop the harassment of American vehicles by
East Germans were important for a number of reasons. Firstly, if the Vopos continued to
get away with that type of behavior, they would significantly injure the Americans'
image. Smyser asserts that when the Vopos stopped American cars, "other travelers
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[along the autobahn], including Berliners, saw how the Vopos could bully Americans."

According to Smyser this would cause West Germans and other Europeans to question
that if the United States was too weak to stand up to the East Germans, how could it pose
enough of a threat to deter Soviet activity, to contain the spread of communism? In
Smyser's view, therefore, the U.S. needed to continue the patrols. 47
Yet Smyser never considers that perhaps the East Germans and Soviets might have
had legitimate concerns or cause to stop and check the vehicles. If the West intended to
mount an attack on the Communists, perhaps beginning with an assault on the wall, it
would make sense that the Americans might transport weapons or equipment from West
Germany to West Berlin along the autobahn. Whether or not the U.S. and its allies
actually had such plans is less relevant than if the Communists believed it to be possible.
If Smyser admits that the Soviets and East Germans might have been acting out of a
sense of genuine concern, then he cannot argue that the Vopos were simply trying to
bully the Americans and that their demands were unreasonable. This, in turn, would
make Clay's military patrols and convoys seem less necessary and more dangerous and
provocative, as many of the "negative-portrayal" historians argue.
Secondly, Smyser asserts that the Soviets may have felt relieved to see the United
States stop the vexation. They even may have welcomed it because they distrusted GDR
leader Ulbricht and worried about him moving against the other occupying powers. He
discusses documents released by the Soviets after Germany's reunification that support
Clay' s views. Smyser states that these documents show that the Soviets worried about
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the ''trigger-happy Vopos" and the trouble they might cause. He never mentions,
however, which specific documents support his arguments about the conflicts between
the Soviets and the GDR. He cites a work by another author, Bruce W. Manning, who
examined these Soviet documents and presented them at a conference in a paper titled
"The Berlin Crisis of 1 96 1 from the Perspective of the Soviet General Staff."48
While rather silent on the issue of autobahn patrols, the "negative-portrayal"
historians often cite Steinstucken as an example of Clay overstepping his bounds on a
trivial matter. They view Clay's actions there as evidence of his relentless drive against
the Soviets. Wyden finds little significance in Clay's efforts in Steinstucken. He
discusses it only in a footnote, referring to the area as "an outlying flyspeck previously
unknown even to most Berliners." He mentions the work on this incident by Honore
Catudal, expressing his surprise that it was worthy of that extensive an examination. He
states, "Remarkably, an entire book celebrates the charade over the soul of this hamlet.',49
Reeves provides more of a discussion of the event. In Reeves' s portrayal, Clay went
to Steinstucken more to bring attention to himself than to boost morale. He states:
"General Clay had arrived back in Berlin late in September. In case there was anyone
who did not notice, one of the first things he had done was try to drive into an enclave
called Steinstucken . . . . He stepped out of the copter and announced that a contingent of
United States Military Police would be stationed in the enclave" (emphasis mine). 50
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Gelb's interpretation of the Steinstucken incident is similar to Wyden's. He presents
the view of Washington officials who wanted to improve relations with the Soviets and
worried that Clay would ruin their chances for success by blowing issues out of
proportion. Gelb states that Clay was "stirring things up over an insignificant bit of
territory nobody had ever heard of before."5 1
Of the "negative-portrayal" historians, the least negative, Ausland, presents a rather
favorable interpretation of the Steinstucken incident. He believes Clay took the right
steps. Ausland asserts, "Thus, a problem that had vexed US officials for years was
settled by a simple action, and one can only wonder why it had not been taken before."52
Ausland's view of the incident falls in line with the ''positive-portrayal" historians
who argue that Clay made the right decision by acting in Steinstucken. In Defense of
Berlin, Smith points out that Steinstucken was technically a part of the American sector
of Berlin, though no American official had visited the area in ten years. "In the face of
the latest Communist measures, many of its residents had given up hope," Smith states.
In Smith's telling of the event, Clay's venture into Steinstucken "demonstrated U.S.
resolve," and "Berlin's morale began to revive.'' Smith appears to share Clay's opinion
that incidents like Steinstucken, far from being trivial, ''would restore Allied prestige in
the divided city if exploited properly. "53
Cate describes the reaction of the grateful villagers when Clay arrived - the woman
who ran to embrace the general, the crowd that gathered to escort him to his meeting, and
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the restaurant owner who rushed over with his finest wine. Cate states that Clay believed
the U.S. needed to act because the presence of East German soldiers violated Berlin's
Four-Power agreements, which banned both East and West German soldiers from the
capital. "This was not something Uncle Sam could meekly accept without a catastrophic
loss of face," Cate asserts. 54
Smyser also presents the situation in terms of American humiliation. He mentions an
East German refugee who had fled to Steinstucken and how the Vopos threatened to enter
the area and seize him even though it was American occupation territory. He asserts,
"Clay believed that neither the U.S. government nor Kennedy himself could live down
the humiliation of having the GDR seize a refugee who had sought American
protection. "55
The issue often discussed in conjunction with the Steinstucken incident is the
existence of a "practice wall." There is as yet no American documentary proof of this
wall. Historians who argue that Clay ordered it to be built rely on secondary sources or
personal interviews with those involved. The source cited most often is Honore
Catudal's Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis. Catudal spoke with General Watson, and
the general discussed being caught between General Clarke and General Clay over the
issue of the wall and Steinstucken. Watson apparently confirmed the practice wall's
existence and that Clay wanted to "punch" through to Steinstucken, though Catudal never
quotes Watson directly on this subject. Catudal does, however, use the exact words of
General Clarke. Clarke told Catudal that he "happened to go to Berlin" and Watson
54
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informed him of the pending "interesting exercise at Steinstucken." Watson then stated
that General Clay gave him the order to send the troops into Steinstucken. Clarke
immediately ordered the troops sent back to their barracks. 56
Beschloss cites this work by Catudal, as well as a television interview with Valentin
Falin, Communist Party adviser. Falin stated in that interview that the Soviets had
learned of plans for American tank officers ''to destroy the Berlin Wall." Beschloss
argues that the Soviets believed Clay wanted to attack the wall and that Clay ordered
walls to be set up in a forest so that the troops could knock them down. Beschloss asserts
that this action was a dangerous provocation. He quotes Falin, stating: "As [Falin]
recalled, had there been a move against the Wall, Soviet tanks would have opened fire,
bringing the United States and Soviet Union 'closer to the third world war than ever . . . .
Had the tank duel started then in Berlin - and everything was running toward it - the
events most probably would have gone beyond any possibility of control. "'57
Wyden uses this "practice wall" as an example of Clay deviating from his assigned
morale-boosting mission to "slap down the Soviets." He states that General Clarke, who
countermanded the practice-wall order and refused to allow Clay to send American
troops into Steinstucken, served as ''the fiercest resistance against [Clay' s] private
agenda." Wyden also cites Catudai as well as Gelb. Reeves mentions the practice wall
and General Clarke's reaction as well. He, too, cites Catudal, along with Cate and an
article by Raymond Garthoff. 58
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In his discussion of the practice wall, Gelb argues that General Watson happily
complied with Clay's order because many West Berliners faulted him for allowing the
construction of the Berlin Wall. He quotes Watson who stated: "Why blame me; I didn't
build that blasted Wall!" Gelb, however, provides no clear source for either piece of
information. He may have spoken with General Watson, but he does not attribute this
quotation to any interview with the general. 59
Of the "negative-portrayal" historians, Raymond Garthoff provides the most detailed
account of the practice wall. He quotes General Clarke, with whom he corresponded, and
referenced interviews with two retired Soviet military intelligence officers, as well as
Falin. The retired intelligence officers stated that the Soviet military intelligence
managed to obtain pictures of the practice wall, which supported the reports they had
received that the Americans planned to tear down the wall. One reason why no American
documentation of this practice wall exists may be because Clarke never reported the
incident to Washington. According to Garthoff, "no one in Washington was fully aware
of the project, much less knew that Clay had actually built a section of wall and tested
specially configured bulldozer tanks against it. ,,60
For the most part, the "positive-portrayal" historians refrain from mentioning the
practice wall. Those that do, however, attempt to prove that it was merely a rumor.
James O'Donnell, Clay's press officer, informed Cate that a number of U.S. officers were
"out to get Clay." Cate concludes that "'the report must have come from some officer on
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General Watson' s staff who wished Clay no good, for there was not a word of truth in it."
Cate states that Clarke learned this fact when he went to Berl� but the trip did little to
reassure Clarke. Cate quotes Clay who told him that he had no memory of Clarke telling
him to "keep your cotton-picking fingers off my men," though he had no doubt Clarke
felt that way. Clay assured Cate that had Clarke actually said that to him, "there would
have been an immediate showdown.',6 1
Although Smith never asks Clay directly about the practice wall in his biography,
Smith addresses the issue in a roundabout way. Smith asks Clay if he ever recommended
tearing down the wall, and Clay replied that he had not. Clay believed that the allies had
their chance to do so only immediately after its construction, but the United States
hesitated too long. By the time Clay arrived in September, he realized that attacking the
wall would lead to an armed conflict, which he wanted to avoid as well. Smith simply
accepts this statement and moves on to another topic. 62
The last incident of the 196 1 Berlin Crisis came in October with the tank
confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie. The ''negative-portrayal" historians blame General
Clay for pushing the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of war over, once
again, a minor issue - presenting allied identification papers to the Vopos. The "positive
portrayal" historians argue that Clay' s actions were necessary to reassert American
occupation rights. These historians tend to "downplay" the danger of the situation in
favor of the significance of what they perceive to be Clay's accomplishments.
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Of the "negative-portrayal" historians, Ausland presents a rather ambiguous version
of the incident. No war or fighting erupted, and even if it had, Ausland asserts that the
United States "probably" could have "contained" the conflict. Yet Ausland never forgets
that the United States could have lost control of the situation very quickly. "It is not easy
to evaluate the outcome of this test of wills," he states. "From one point of view, both
sides were fortunate that the tanks did not fire at each other, since no one can say with
certainty how much explosive lay at the other end of the fuse. American officials in
Berlin believed that the conflict would have been contained. While they were probably
right, who can say for certain?" The words he chooses serve to remind the reader that
although the conflict ended peacefully, it could have very easily resulted in the exchange
of firepower.63
Beschloss, on the other hand, describes the incident in a sensational fashion. In trying
to convey the existing tension of the situation, he uses quotations intended to convince
the reader that total war was only a heartbeat away. He states: "This was the first time in
history that American and Soviet tanks had ever confronted each other. The United
States tank commander, Lt. Col. Thomas Tyre, feared an expected event that would touch
off open military conflict with the Russians, 'such as a nervous soldier discharging his
weapon' or 'some tanker stepping accidentally on his accelerator leading to a runaway
tank. ",64
He quotes Lightner to demonstrate further the danger of the situation. Beschloss
suggests that Clay increased the potential for trouble when he ordered the troops to be
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armed with rifles when escorting Lightner's car through the checkpoint. He states, "As
Lightner recalled, if the Vopos had tried to stop [the armed escort of the car] 'by shooting
one ofus, we would have had to kill all of them. . . . All hell would have broken loose. "'
With the use of his quotations, Beschloss attempts to demonstrate General Clay's
recklessness. Beschloss describes the Checkpoint Charlie incident as a potentially deadly,
certainly volatile situation brought on by General Clay's dangerously confrontational
behavior. 65
Like Beschloss, Wyden tries to make clear the heavy tension of those few days in
Berlin for the reader. Wanting to ensure the reader grasps the deadly seriousness of the
situation, he refers to it as the "defused inflammable tank incident." He begins by stating
that the opening of a CBS reporter's broadcast "was a heart stopper." In describing the
scene in Berlin, Wyden says that "the incendiary nature of the tableau was unmistakable
and trouble could start from East or West.',66
Wyden also uses the accounts of reporters to demonstrate that others at the time
believed the situation to be just as dire as Wyden portrays it. Wyden asserts that "[CBS
reporter Dan] Schorr thought World War III might be close at hand, and so did such other
seasoned eyewitnesses as [Sydney] Gruson of the [New York] Times." Wyden quotes
Gruson, who said, "I always thought that when push came to shove, the U.S. and the
Russians would not fight, but Clay was running an intense, high-stake game. An accident
was always possible. "67

65

Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 333.
Wyden, Wall, 266, 260, 262.
67
Ibid., 262.
66

35
Wyden argues that Clay had his own mission, and the worst example of this behavior
occurs with the Checkpoint Charlie incident when, as Wyden states, "Clay's personal
crusade of brinkmanship picked up momentum on the night of Sunday, October 22.''
Wyden argues that Clay deliberately disobeyed the State Department who advised Clay
to "go slow." Clay appealed his case for action to the president who gave his permission.
Wyden states that officials in Washington were "incensed over Clay's
' melodramatizing. "' According to Wyden, Clay had little to do with preventing the
situation from erupting into war. That honor belonged to Kennedy who was really the
one in charge. Wyden argues that Kennedy's appeal to Khrushchev, who ordered the
withdrawal of the Soviet tanks to avoid further conflict, ended the confrontation. In
Wyden's telling, Clay put America's hand in the fire, and Kennedy pulled it out.68
Much like Wyden, Reeves discusses the tank incident with Clay as a dangerous
troublemaker and Kennedy as the reasonable hero. According to Reeves, when Kennedy
later assured Clay that while others in Washington may have lost their nerve, he retained
his, Kennedy based his confidence on his own relationship with Khrushchev. "If
Kennedy was in fact less nervous than those around him," Reeves argues, "it was because
he believed he had finally established one-on-one contact with Khrushchev." Reeves
credits this relationship for ending the crisis. Kennedy communicated with Khrushchev
through back channels, and both men agreed to pull back their tanks. 69
In Gelb's version of the tank incident, Clay's showdown with the Soviets was
unnecessary and dangerous. Gelb calls it "an undignified border squabble." Kennedy
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and the State Department never would have bothered with the situation had Clay not had
other plans. Gelb asserts that Kennedy supported Clay only because he feared provoking
the general. The crisis ended when Washington and the Soviets had had enough and
wanted to put an end to the situation. Clay's efforts had little to do with the final
resolution. He also discusses General Norstad's feelings to remind the reader that the
situation could have very easily moved in a direction for which Clay was unprepared. He
states: "The question was, After you bring our few tanks to the Wall, what do you do next
if the Soviets either do not show up or do show up and just stay there'r' 70
Raymond Garthoff presents the Checkpoint Charlie incident as incredibly dangerous.
He focuses solely on the "practice wall" and the threat it posed to the Soviets and the East
Germans. In light of Soviet fears of Western espionage, Gartho:ff argues, the GDR' s
demands for Lightner's identification "seem reasonable." Clay then escalates the crisis
when calling for the tanks, thereby bringing the United States and Soviet Union closer to
war quite unnecessarily. Gartho:ff assigns blame for the tank incident to Clay for
constructing the "practice wall" initially and then worsening the situation by protesting
the identification requests with such military force.7 1
These historians present the view from Washington, and Gearson provides the
London interpretation of the Checkpoint Charlie incident. As Gearson tells the story, the
issue arose over the GDR's demand to inspect allied personnel' s identification. "Clay . . .
decided to adopt a hard line," he states. "The relatively minor question of passes now
began to develop into a major trial of strength." Clay's actions "dismayed" the British,
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and they immediately wanted to know "if Clay was acting largely independently or
whether the president backed his policy." As with the accounts of Beschloss and Reeves,
the crisis ended because of the clear-headed Kennedy. In this case, Kennedy allegedly
promised to be more flexible in negotiations on the Berlin issue in exchange for the
withdrawal of Soviet tanks. Once more, a historian portrays Clay as a dangerous man
who risked war over a minor issue and pushed the West into a difficult position from
which it needed to be rescued by the wise President Kennedy. 72
In the versions of historians such as Smith, Clay's efforts to reassert Western rights
and four-power control were essential to U.S. goals in Berlin. When the situation with
Lightner at the border erupted on October 22, according to Smith, Clay needed to act
quickly to prevent "an impending crisis." Smith shares Clay' s view on the importance of
presenting identification to the East Germans. "The East German demand . . . was
extremely significant.," Smith states. "It was another Communist attempt to end the few
remaining vestiges of four-power control." 73
Unfortunately, in Smith's view, for the United States' position, its ally Great Britain
disagreed with Clay. Smith asserts that this hurt the U.S. mission. When entering East
Berlin that week, British officials readily complied with the GDR's order and presented
their identification. With this act, according to Smith, the Soviets "discerned a crack in
the Western ranks." They refused to back down and denied Watson's protest. The
United States would have to comply with the GDR' s regulations. 74
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Once Smith recounts the events of the Checkpoint Charlie incident and presents his
view that Clay knew all along the proper course for the United States to take, he then
discusses the significant outcomes of the incident. In Smith's view, the tank crisis
demonstrated many important points. The United States destroyed a crucial Communist
argument by exposing Ulbricht as merely Moscow's puppet. The GDR could no longer
claim to be sovereig� nor could even the Soviets trust them. The Americans also
revealed that Soviet threats to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR had little
meaning. Once again, the United States demonstrated that the East would back down
when confronted by a show of determination. Most importantly, Smith argues, Clay
regained some of the prestige the United States lost with building of the Berlin Wall. He
restored the morale of the West Berliners and West Germans and temporarily stayed the
wave of Communist infringements upon allied rights. 75
Once Smith argues the tremendous value of Clay's maneuvers, he discusses those
who disagreed with Clay's actions. Immediately after the crisis ended, members of the
Kennedy administration began to criticize Clay's handling of the situation. The
expression of "official" disapproval of Clay only increased as time passed. Most British
officials shared this view, even going so far as to tell Soviet officials that the U.S. would
soon recall General Clay. Smith states that Washington and London's effort to distance
themselves from Clay's conduct threatened to undermine all that Clay accomplished.
Soon after Clay's disparagement, East German authorities began detaining members of
the U.S. mission to Berlin as well as U.S. army vehicles. Clay, despite the attacks
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received from Washington, refused to acquiesce to East German pretensions. Smith
states that ''when the Communists saw that Clay was not leaving, they soon desisted from
further encroachments."76
In Smith's account, Clay is the hero who must defeat the enemy, while also fighting
against those who should have been supporting him. In his descriptions, Smith paints
these Washington and London dissenters as cowards who were "completely out of touch
with the daily situationin Berlin." He compares the opposition Clay faced in the
Checkpoint Charlie incident to that of the Berlin blockade and airlift. Smith states, "The
risks seemed to multiply the further one moved from the scene of action." NATO
members, London, Washington, and especially those who favored negotiation with the
Soviets believed Clay went to the brink of war "over an essentially minor issue." He
states that "had the United States backed away from the confrontation at Checkpoint
Charlie, a crisis of morale similar to that which occurred in August would have ensued.
In such an event, it is unlikely that our position in Berlin could have been held."77
According to Smith, the United States needed to stand up to East Germans and stop
the harassment of allied officials. The United States would have lost its valuable position
in Berlin if the Communists had succeeded in forcing the United States to comply with
East German demands. Dulles shares Smith's view of the Checkpoint Charlie incident.
She criticizes Washington for not supporting Clay because they feared a showdown. She
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asserts that because officials in Washington failed to support Clay in his attempts to stop
Communist encroachments on allied rights "the crisis ofAugust continued." 78
Clay's determination to resist the Communists partially reversed the United States'

negative image, according to Dulles. Clay forced the Soviets to assume their role once
again and restore quadripartite control ofBerlin. She asserts that while some people
outside ofBerlin failed to realize the significance ofClay's achievement, "the experts,
aware ofthe Four Power legal agreements, knew ofthe significance ofthe Soviet
position in the city" and what the return ofSoviet tanks to the border represented. Dulles
asserts the incident also demonstrated to the world the United States's willingness to act
and may have convinced Khrushchev to withdraw his peace treaty ultimatum. 79
Dulles, however supplies no real evidence to support her claims. She discusses no
newspaper or journal articles on any change in the U.S. image. She does not identify the
"Americans [who concluded] that this confrontation was an important move in forcing
the Soviets to reassert their role" or the "experts [who ] . . . knew ofthe significance ofthe
Soviet position in the city." Writing this work in 1 97 1 , she uses interviews and
conversations with people who had been involved in the Berlin Crisis to reconstruct the
events. But she chose not to name her sources in most cases in order "to avoid
embarrassment to those who are still involved in these problems or who have explored
with me controversial issues involving friends and associates." By not naming her
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sources or citing documents, Dulles weakens her argument that Clay's actions had a
positive impact.80
Trivers agrees with Dulles on the necessity of confronting the East Germans at
Checkpoint Charlie. He states that if Clay had not been in Berlin after the initial
confrontation on Sunday evening, October 22, "the American military and civilian
authorities in Berlin would have been obliged to crawl back ignominiously from the
strong position taken on Sunday evening." Trivers argues that Washington so feared
upsetting the delicate peace in Berlin, they wanted to avoid any situation that could lead
to a serious confrontation. Trivers also asserts that many Washington officials "doubtless
regarded the issue as too picayune for a show of force." Trivers shares Clay's view that
if the United States wanted to maintain its credibility with the Communists, it must not
tolerate East German pretensions. 8 1
Trivers was in Berlin at the time of the incident, and in addition to sharing Clay's
adamancy of the confrontation's importance, Trivers also worried little about the incident
getting out of control. He states in his book that "there was little likelihood of war" from
Checkpoint Charlie incident. Trivers expressed his views to the British political adviser
Keith Matthews when he called Trivers, demanding to know what the American thought
they were doing. Trivers said that he told Matthews:
There was no reason for concern. The East Germans with the Soviet approval had
been denying us the right of the free movement of our vehicles into East Berlin. In
order demonstratively to assert our rights, we had brought up tanks and used military
police escorts. We had a fine group of well-controlled officers and men at
Friedrichstrasse. There was no likelihood that our men would initiate any shooting,
and there was likewise manifest restraint on the other side. Besides, Gen. Clay had
80
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accomplished his purpose when the Soviet tanks moved down to the East Berlin
Friedrichstrasse crossing. Gen. Clay had wanted to force the Soviets to acknowledge
Soviet authority and responsibility in East Berlin. When the Soviet tanks appeared,
the fiction of East German responsibility for the denial of our access to East Berlin
was destroyed and Soviet responsibility proven. The point having been made, we
anticipated that the American tanks would soon be withdrawn. 82
Although General Clay's methods concerned Washington and London, Trivers insists
that it brought about a number of "decidedly beneficial" outcomes. It increased the West
Berliners' morale. He states that "they believed that [Clays' forceful action] was the only
language the Communists understoo� and it encouraged them to keep faith in American
assurances of their security against Communist attacks." Clay may have also convinced
the Soviets it would be foolhardy to provoke another situation in Berlin. Trivers asserts
that the Soviets most likely "regarded Gen. Clay as a 'dangerous' man - no greater
compliment could be paid to him." Trivers, however, cites no news reports or polls to
demonstrate the improvement in Berliners' morale or the Soviets' perceptions of General
Clay. He apparently relies on his own recollection and observations during that time. He
furnishes no proof, other than his own assurances, that the West Berliners really believed
that force "was the only language the Communists understood" or that they found the use
of it encouraging. 83
Cate asserts that the real responsibility for the Checkpoint Charlie incident lay with
Washington. Cate suggests that by failing to follow in Clay's strong determination,
Washington paved the way for more Communist encroachments. "Growing more cocky
with each passing day, the East Germans now decided to humiliate the Western Allies
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even further by forcing them to show their identity papers when entering the Soviet sector
- something the Allies had never had to do before." Despite the lack of support from
Washington, Clay insisted that the Communists not be allowed to succeed. Cate, sharing
Clay's viewpoint, believes in the importance of stopping the East Germans. He states,
"Thus, by 11:00 p.m. on [October 22), the U.S. Commandant, inspired and directed by
General Clay, had made it clear to the East Germans that the Americans were not going
to be deprived of one additional right as one of the occupying powers simply to suit
Walter Ulbricht's whim."84
In Cate's account, there was little danger of war. Clay quickly realized the
opportunity present to expose GDR sovereignty as a lie and devised a plan. Cate
suggests that Clay knew just how far he could go without risking war, and he set out to
prove his objective. General Clay refused to cancel the military escorts after he found out
that Wednesday's meetings between American and Soviet representatives accomplished
nothing. "He was pleased to learn that the Russians were beginning to get worried," Cate
states. "This was exactly what he wanted. "85
Cate further demonstrates the situation's lack of serious danger by discussing
incidents oflevity. He states, "Although it had seemed a scary business to people living
hundreds or thousands of miles away, to observers on the spot this muzzle-to-muzzle
confrontation had even had its comic moments." Cate then tells of an incident in which a
U.S. tank gunner nervously fingered his machine gun at the moment a helicopter flew
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overhead. An East German captain ran to a Reuters correspondent and yelled at him to
get out ofthe way because the Americans were shooting.86
In his biography ofClay, Smith presents Clay's view ofthe event. Smith quotes Clay
who believed that acquiescing to East German demands during the Checkpoint Charlie
incident for identification undermined the United States legal authority in Berlin, which
the allies based on the quadripartite status ofthe city. Clay stated:
The East Germans were trying to insist that they had the right to inspect the identity
papers of Allied personnel going to East Berlin. This was a direct violation ofall the
agreements that had established the quadripartite status of Berlin. Since 1945,
members ofthe Occupation forces could move freely throughout all ofBerlin. If we
had permitted the East Germans to interfere with this, it would have really destroyed
West Berlin morale. Because we would have been letting the East Germans, not the
Russians, exercise the sovereignty over Berlin that we claimed resided in the four
powers.87
After the initial incident on Sunday evening with Lightner, Clay believed that the
United States must "force the Russians to show up and take responsibility." Since
August the Soviets had maintained that the GDR constructed the wall and that the Soviets
did nothing. The Soviets further argued that the four-power status ofBerlin no longer
existed. Once the Soviets brought forth their tanks, however, they dispelled that
assertion. Smith quotes Clay who stated: "As soon as [the Soviet tanks arrived], I was no
longer concerned. The Russians were in charge. We were not going to have to deal with
the East Germans. And that was the whole purpo se. "88
Smith asserts that the confrontation was quite a success for Clay and "an exercise
well done." He mentions Washington and London's displeasure at Clay's actions, but
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"Clay had punctured the myth of East German sovereignty over East Berlin." Smith
argues that although Clay made Washington nervous, "those in Berlin rejoiced that he
was there." Smith quotes Howard Trivers in saying that had Clay not been in Berlin, the
United States and its allies would have surrendered their rights to the city by giving into
East German demands. Once again, Clay is portrayed as the knowing hero who saves the
ungrateful Washington from its own ineptness. 89
By discussing Clay's intentions and insight into the Soviet mind, Smyser argues that
little threat of danger existed from the Checkpoint Charlie incident. In Smyser's account
of the situation, Ulbricht felt frustrated because the Soviet Congress supported
Khrushchev's less confrontational policies on the Berlin issue, and he wanted to take
definitive action to show American impotence in the face of Communist aggression. The
introduction of American tanks by Clay turned up the intensity of the confrontation. The
Soviets realized they had to block the U.S.tanks from going through the checkpoint or
else "authorize the East Germans to do so." Smyser asserts that the latter was out of the
question because the Soviets ''knew that having Ulbricht confront U.S. tanks would add
to the unpredictability of an already explosive situation."90
The Soviets had to bring up their own tanks, and Clay felt relieved when they did for
it meant they were taking responsibility for Berlin. Smyser states that Clay believed the
arrival of the Soviet tanks "eliminated any chance that Ulbricht might provoke a real
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crisis." Smyser asserts that Clay viewed "the Soviet tanks as a sign that the Soviets did
not trust Ulbricht and wanted to take over when the risks grew too high."9 1
Smyser contends that the Soviets and Kennedy each learned a valuable lesson from
the Checkpoint Charlie incident. Now that they had seen what Ulbricht would do with
too much freedom to act, the Soviets realized they needed to restrain Ulbricht and the
sovereignty ofthe GDR for the time being. As for Kennedy, Smyser argues that he
discovered his advisers were wrong when they told him he had to avoid confrontation
"because the Soviets would always escalate to the point ofwar." There existed some
room to maneuver. According to Smyser, Kennedy owed this discovery to Clay, and he
appreciated the general's efforts. In Smyser's telling, Kennedy realized what later
historians such as Smith and even Smyser himself would argue - that Clay understood
the situation in Berlin better than anyone else. He knew what actions the U.S. needed to
take to restore faith in Americans again and just how far to push the Soviets without
provoking a very dangerous confrontation. 92
In his discussion ofthe events ofOctober, McDermott discusses the "powerful boost"
Clay's arrival gave to West Berlin morale. He asserts that "in the eight months [Clay]
spent in the city he did a job for the morale ofthe Berliners which no one else could have
done." Even though many in London expressed their great displeasure about the
incident, McDermott maintains that Clay did what he needed to do. Clay accomplished
this task as best as could be expected, and, in doing so, he succeeded in his larger goal of
restoring West Berlin morale. McDermott states:
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The Americans, who had made their point with force, were criticised by some faint
hearts for playing an unnecessarily dangerous game. They were also criticised for not
consulting their allies in advance. My view, which I expressed to General AI Watson,
was that it was a successful operation, well executed if a little dangerous, and that
they had kept us pretty well informed considering its warlike nature and the
consequent need for all speed and secrecy. The West Berliners were delighted to see
the initiative taken, for once, by the West, and regarded the whole affair as a salutary
thwack in the teeth for the communists. 93
In their attempts to prove Clay conducted himself properly, many of these "positive
portrayal" historians, particularly Smith and Dulles, present Washington and London
officials as weak. They were too concerned about the Soviets to take the necessary
forceful actions. These historians fail to probe deeper, to determine the origins behind
their concerns. Was it just that these officials feared confrontation with the Soviets? If
the Checkpoint Charlie incident was so important, why could Washington not see that?
These historians never answer those questions, nor do they really attempt to do so.
The examination of the events of the 1961 Berlin Crisis demonstrates a clear
dichotomy of opinion about General Clay. Historians who believe the incidents to be very
dangerous and bringing the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of war view
Clay as a ''wild card" who was, or made the Berlin situation, "difficult."94 Historians
who feel the situation required such decisive action describe Clay in positive terms and
argue that Washington made Clay's job difficult. 95 Now that this correlation has been
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demonstrated, the task at hand must be to determine where these negative and positive
views of Clay originate. Why do these historians view Clay as they do?
The secondary sources these historians used may have affected how they viewed
General Clay and the events in Berlin. Cate, who views Clay favorably, uses Trivers's
work and those of Smith. As demonstrated earlier, Trivers agrees with Clay on many
aspects of his Berlin policies, and much of the information in both of Smith's accounts
comes from interviews with Clay. It is quite possible that Trivers and Smith's positive
portrayals influenced Cate and account for his depiction of Clay. The same holds true for
Smyser, who also references Smith as well as Cate. Both Cate and Smyser interviewed
Clay as well. These two examples certainly support the theory that sources account for a
historian's perceptions.
Two other examples, however, discount this source theory. Reeves takes information
from Cate, Trivers, and Smith to explain the incident in his account. Despite the positive
evaluation of Clay in these works, Reeves portrays the opposite view of Clay. In fact,
Reeves discusses Washington officials who believed Clay would continue in his Berlin
quest until he crushed the Soviets, but he never provides the reader with opinions from
officials who supported Clay. Trivers argues that he, too, believed the United States
needed to act forcefully and quickly to deter the Communists from any further
encroachments on allied rights. Reeves cites Trivers but refrains from quoting the former
political adviser on that matter. Gelb also uses Cate and Trivers without sharing their
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approval of Clay. Reeves and Gelb clearly disprove the theory that historians'
perceptions of General Clay can be traced to their secondary sources. 96
The other works in this study confirm the near irrelevance of secondary source usage
in accounting for this dichotomy of opinion. Some use their own recollections to tell the
story (Ausland, Sorense°' and Trivers). Others rely on their interviews with government
officials involved in the crisis (Beschloss, Dulles, Smith, and Gelb). As expected, the
authors also use documents and newspaper accounts. Some other factor must account for
these differing views.
Perhaps Smith's assertion in The Defense of Berlin explains this correlation. He
states that during the Checkpoint Charlie incident that ''the risks seemed to multiply the
further one moved from the scene of action."97 It could be that the focus of the authors'
stories determines their conception of Clay and the incident. This certainly proves to be
the case with Trivers and Smith. Trivers was in Berlin and participated in discussions
with the Soviets as they walked along the border crossing. Smith's biography of Clay
obviously focuses on Clay in Berlin. His earlier book, The Defense of Berlin, also keeps
its focus on events in Berlin. Cate also focuses on Berlin; the discussions in Washington
provoked by the crisis remain the secondary story. Dulles discusses American policy as
it applies to German issues, so her story rests squarely in Berlin. She gains her
information from those who were on the scene during the crisis. Smyser sets out to tell
the complete story of Germany in the Cold War. Like Cate, he focuses on events in
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Berlin with the repercussions in Washington being of secondary importance. All of the
"positive portrayal" historians center their story in Berlin. They quote sources who were
in Berlin at the time and faced the situation first-hand daily. They follow Smith' s
assertion that closer to the scene of action the dangers seemed few.
The "negative portrayal" historians also confirm Smith's theory. These accounts
focus on Washington. Reeves' s biography of President Kennedy naturally tells the story
from the White House' s perspectives. Sorensen does this as well. He provides his
recollections of events in Kennedy's presidency because he served in the administration.
He was in Washington and interacted daily with member of the State Department and
others who disliked Clay. Their opinions easily could have affected Sorensen's own.
Wyden and Gelb also focus on Washington, giving voice to the various State Department
members and White House and Pentagon officials who worried about Clay complicating
the Berlin situation. They both directly quote National Security Adviser McGeorge
Bundy who found Clay "difficult." Beschloss's work examining Kennedy' s relationship
with Khrushchev and how that affected the Cold War. He discusses events like the
Charlie Checkpoint incident mainly in the context ofthat relationship, so he focuses most
often on Washington. He also mentions Bundy's opinion of Clay and his "threats" to
resign. By viewing the Checkpoint Charlie incident through the eyes of the Washington
officials who worried that any confrontation would lead to nuclear war, these historians
came to share the officials' perspectives on Clay and Berlin. Consequently, the authors
viewed Clay as "difficult" and a "wild card" out for his own agenda and the incident as a
barely averted catastrophe.
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The examination of these works corroborates Smith's assertion that officials in
Washington and London - and the historians who cite them - found the events in Berlin
riskier than did those who were on the scene. Why would that be? One might naturally
think that people in Berlin would be more concerned about these incidents escalating
because they would be the ones in danger if war broke out. Perhaps people like Trivers
and McDermott believed it was worth the risk. More than anything, they believed, the
United States needed to reassert allied rights, stand up to the Soviets and the GDR, and
restore the morale of the West Berliners and the West Germans. They believed Berlin to
be the pivotal point of contention in the Cold War.
Officials in Washingto� on the other hand, had to manage a number of crises during
Kennedy's administration. Berlin was only one of the many "hot spots" in the Cold War.
Vietnam, Laos, and other areas in Southeast Asia took up much of the time and energy of
the State Department members, as did China. Communism closer to American shores in
Cuba and Latin America was another great concern. They were also trying to negotiate
an agreement with the Soviet Union for a nuclear test ban treaty. In regard to the Berlin
Crisis, Washington also had to contend with the wishes and frustrations of France, Great
Britain, and West Germany. Kennedy and the State Department were committed to
containing the spread of communism all over the world, not just in Europe.
Washington had many communist fires to put out, and when conflict erupted in
Berlin, it increased the tension between the U.S. and its allies, as well as with the Soviet
Union. France and Great Britain protested that the U.S. Mission in Berlin failed to
consult with them during the Checkpoint Charlie incident. Reasserting American rights
in Berlin at the expense of the Soviet Union's ally, the GDR, would certainly hinder
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negotiations with the Soviets. Also, whenever these incidents in Berlin arose, it took the
officials' attentions away from these other concerns to focus on making sure the situation
in Berlin did not escalate further. It may not be that Washington believed Berlin to be
unimportant, rather they viewed it as one ofmany significant areas ofconcern.
This theory, that perception ofGeneral Clay was based on perspective of Berlin in the
Cold War, explains why Ausland and Garthoff do not fit the earlier model. Ausland
served on the Berlin Task force and presents the story from the perspective ofan official
in Berlin. In his account, Clay's arrival made the Task Force's work "more difficult," but
he attributes that to the different approaches taken by Clay and Kennedy. Clay favored
action, and Kennedy preferred to conduct a dialogue. Ausland makes no attempt to
portray Clay as reckless or dangerous - he simply complicated the already complex
situation. He was in Berlin and, therefore, may have believed in the priority ofthe Berlin
situation, which was why he does not portray Clay as reckless. He understood Clay 's
thinking and may have agreed with the necessity of his actions. 98
Garthoff focuses his story on Berlin, but he presents a very negative view of Clay.
Garthoff served in the State Department during 1 961, undoubtedly working with many of
the Washington officials who disliked and distrusted Clay. Not surprisingly, Garthoff's
account has little positive to say about General Clay. He focuses on the danger Clay
presented with his "practice wall."
The British accounts in this study, McDermott and Gearson, also suggest that
interpretation ofGeneral Clay and the Berlin Crisis depends on one's perspective on the
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importance of Berlin in the Cold War. Further analysis outside the scope of this study,
however, is needed in order to determine whether non-American accounts of the
Checkpoint Charlie incident follow the pattern established in this study.
As this study has shown, historians' perceptions of General Clay and his role in the
1961 Berlin Crisis depend on how much importance they place on Berlin in the Cold
War. Historians who view Berlin as the central concern of the Cold War find that the
Communist threat to American rights and West Berliners' morale was so great as to
necessitate Clay's measures. Historians who see Berlin as only one of many crises do not
believe that Clay needed to take the steps that he did and, therefore, argue that his actions
needlessly risked provoking war. The next chapter argues that the latter view is more
valid. Even though General Clay needed at times to stand up to Soviet and East German
encroachments on Western allied rights, the manner in which Clay attempted to prove his
point often unnecessarily risked making the situation much worse.
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Chapter Three - Which Interpretation Is More Valid
The historians discussed in this study often seem so convinced of the accuracy of
their picture of General Clay that they never really address the issues brought up by other
scholars. Wyden asserts that Clay went into Berlin with his own agenda, ''to slap down
the Soviets," but he never really entertains the idea that perhaps, as historians such as
Smyser argue, part of boosting Berliners' morale meant demonstrating U.S. strength and
making the Soviets adhere to their legal agreements. Smyser, in turn, along with Trivers
and Smith, believe so strongly that Clay was right about the necessity for action that they
assume he must have been right in the steps he took. They tend to gloss over the more
provocative of Clay' s actions, such as the "practice wall" or his initial plans for
Steinstucken. It is as if they never considered that Clay could have been both a little right
and reckless, perhaps in fear that to admit any legitimacy in the other argument would
negate their own. In any case, by addressing only part of the question, neither side
provides the definitive answer on General Clay and the Berlin Crisis.
This is not to suggest that this essay is the complete and final answer to the Clay in
Berlin question. Admittedly, with a couple of exceptions, this study has examined only
the Americanist perspectives of those incidences. To truly determine how right or
reckless Clay was, one would need to take into account the reactions of all the people
involved, including the Germans and the Soviets. To accomplish this, one must study the
Cold War documents of the Soviet Union and the GDR. Incorporating these sources
would provide more information on how they interpreted Clay' s actions and their
reasoning behind their own actions. Without exploring these issues, any study on
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Checkpoint Charlie and its related events will be constrained in its ability to provide the
definitive word on General Clay's return to Berlin.
This chapter addresses the issues raised by historians on both sides in exploring
whether General Clay was right in his actions in the Berlin Crisis. Did, as the "negative
portrayal" historians claim, Clay recklessly and needlessly push the United States to the
brink of war over Berlin in 1961? Or did he, as the "positive-portrayal" historians assert,
merely fulfill the role assigned to him by President Kennedy in an attempt to bolster the
morale of the West Berliners and prove U.S. determination? By examining all of the
evidence presented by the historians in this study, this essay argues that General Clay's
actions in Berlin were - if not unnecessary - extreme and needlessly dangerous.
The first step in deciding whether General Clay was right or reckless is determining
what Clay's mission was and whether or he overstepped the bounds of his assignment.
The "negative-portrayal" historians certainly believe he did so. They assert President
Kennedy sent Clay to Berlin as a symbolic gesture, never intending for Clay to actually
do anything, but Clay had other ideas. Wyden states: "The President had dispatched him
to buck up the Berliners; Clay decided that his prime mission was to slap down the
Soviets."99
In order to verify that Wyden is correct and that Kennedy sent Clay to Berlin only to
signify U.S. commitment without taking any real steps to demonstrate it, one must study
Kennedy's words on the matter. Unfortunately, Kennedy died before he could give any
thoughtful commentary on many of the events and issues of his presidency. Historians,
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therefore, have only his presidential papers and the few recorded statements made during
his administration, such as his announcement appointing Clay as his "personal
representative in Berlin with the rank of Ambassador," which tells little about Clay's
actual duties. Kennedy stated:
While this appointment will not change the existing responsibilities of our military
and diplomatic officers in Germany and Berlin, General Clay will be in close touch
with such men as Ambassador Dowling in Bonn, and General Watson, our Berlin
Commandant, and the appointment adds to our resources of judgement and action by
placing in a most important city an American in whom the Secretary of State and I
have unusual confidence. 100
From this statement, one could easily agree with the "negative-portrayal" historians and
decide that Kennedy intended Clay's mission to be a symbo lie one, particularly with the
phrase ''this appointment will not change the existing responsibilities of our military and
diplomatic responsibilities."
One could also infer, however, that the statement "the appointment adds to our
resources of judgement and action" meant that Clay could advise Ambassador Dowling
and General Watson if the Soviets precipitated a crisis. Indeed, one could make the
argument that was what Clay did. The harassment by East Germans of allied vehicles
along the autobahn and the residents of Steinstucken began shortly after Clay began his
official duties in Berlin on September 1 5. Also the Vopos caused the conflict at
Checkpoint Charlie, one might assert, because they refused to accept the U.S. occupation
license plates on Lightner's vehicle as sufficient identification when previously they had.
Clay did not created these problems, rather he worked to solve them. His taking action in
these cases appears to follow the mandate of his mission as outlined by Kennedy.
100
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The manner in which he attempted to ease these situations, however, might have been
out of line. In all three incidents, Clay gave orders not advice. Kennedy was very vague
about Clay's specific duties and his role. He never stated directly that Clay had the right
to give orders, but did Clay's title as the president's "personal representative" and as a
"resource ofjudgement and action" imply that he could? Clay clearly believed that it did,
but the ambiguity of Kennedy's statement provides no real answer.
Regardless of whether Kennedy intended for Clay to be able to dictate U.S. action in
Berlin, Clay did just that. Once in Berlin, General Clay took steps he believed were
necessary to fulfill his continuing goal of revitalizing West Berlin morale and· serve as
President Kennedy's "personal representative." In addition to the military convoys he
sent to patrol the autobahn, Clay ordered U.S. forces to delay Soviet car coming into
West Berlin if they harassed Americans going into East Berlin. Clay asserted that he
intended for this step "to prove that our presence in Berlin was something between the
United States and the Russians - not the East Germans." Then after he rescued some
East German refugees who had fled to Steinstucken, which was part of West Berlin
though it was separated by a strip of East German territory, Clay stationed a few U.S.
Military Police officers in the area to deter the Vopos from harassing more villagers. 101
In both of these incidents, Clay decided on a course of action and issued orders with
little to no discussion. In Smith's biography of Clay, the general discussed his attempts
to respect the political chain of command by first contacting the secretary of state who
would then refer him to the president. This does not appear to be the case with the
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military aspect of his role. This is partly Kennedy' s fault for not clearly outlining Clay's
place in the chain of command. General Clay arrived in Berlin not really knowing to
whom, if anyone, he reported. Clay, however, never tried to answer that question. He
appears to have believed he answered only to the president. He never cleared or even
discussed his decisions on the autobahn patrols, Steinstucken, or Checkpoint Charlie with
General Clarke, commander of the U.S. army in Europe, or General Norstad, the U.S.
commander in chief in Europe and supreme allied commander for Europe.
Even though with the Checkpoint Charlie incident, Clay insisted that the Soviets
reassert their role in the four-power control of Berlin, Clay apparently did not feel a
strong need to respect that four-power control where it concerned the Western Allies.
The United States was not alone in Berlin, but Clay worried little about upsetting Great
Britain and France because he believed that West Berliners cared only about what the
Americans did. By making his own decisions about what actions were appropriate, Clay
upset the chain of command in Europe and risked creating a great deal of chaos in a
situation that called for stability. 1 02
As Kennedy's ''personal representative in Berlin," Clay' s actions should correspond
with the policies set by Kennedy and his administrators. Put simply, did the steps clay
took to restore the Berliners' morale fall in line with Kennedy's earlier statements and
actions regarding the Berlin Crisis? Answering this question is the next step in
determining whether lay was right in his Berlin decision-making.
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President Kennedy endured many crises domestic and foreign during his tenure in
office, and the first time he really addressed the issue of Berlin was the Vienna
Conference with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in June 196 1 . When their talks turned
to the issue of Berlin, Khrushchev again discussed a peace treaty with East Germany,
which would end U.S. occupation rights, and set another six-month deadline as he had
with President Dwight Eisenhower. Kennedy told Khrushchev the Soviets were free to
· do as they wished as long as they refrained from threatening allied occupation rights in
West Berlin. Khrushchev found this unacceptable, informing Kennedy that ''the USSR
would never, under any conditions, accept US rights in West Berlin after a peace treaty
had been signed." He said that the Soviets would defend the GDR if the U.S. violated its
borders, stating that "force would be met by force" and that war was up to the United
States. The Soviets would be signing a peace treaty with East Germany in December,
which would force the allies out of Berlin. The next month Kennedy released a
statement, which outlined his three essential issues on the Berlin question: the freedom of
West Berlin, allied rights in West Berlin, and Western access to West Berlin. Kennedy
asserted that that U.S. would defend these rights by force if necessary, but he said nothing
about rights to all of Berlin, merely West Berlin. 1 03
The erection of the wall in August to cut off the refugee flow did nothing to threaten
the people of West Berlin, allied occupation of West Berlin, or Western access to West
Berlin. As such, Kennedy and the other Western powers decided that the wall required
no immediate action on their part and, with their leak plugged, the Soviets and the GDR
03
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would take no further action. In a meeting of the Berlin Steering Group on August 1 5,
Rusk asserted "that while the border closing was a most serious matter . . . it would make
a Berlin settlement easier." Those present at the meeting agreed that the wall was not a
"shooting issue," rather the problem was "essentially one of propaganda." In private,
Kennedy said: "This is the end of the Berlin Crisis. The other side panicked - not us.
We're not going to do anything new because there is no ahernative except war. It's all
over, they're not going to overrun Berlin." 104
Clearly the� President Kennedy wanted measures taken in Berlin only when Western
rights were violated. The harassment of allied vehicles along the autobahn certainly
qualifies, as it threatened the right of Western access to West Berlin. Indeed in a letter to
the general written in early October after incidents on the autobahn. Kennedy agreed
with Clay that Americans needed "to be prompt and energetic'' in their responses to any
harassment of U.S. access to Berlin, "to avoid misunderstanding, and to prevent the
hardening of a new status quo. " 105
Clay's efforts in Steinstucken also fulfill Kennedy's requirements for action. Even
though the area of Steinstucken was separated from greater West Berlin by a small strip
of East German land, it was still considered part of West Berlin. The people of
Steinstucken, therefore, merited the supporting defensive action of the United States
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because they were West Berliners, and the Vopos threatened their freedom. On July 25,
1961, President Kennedy swore to maintain American commitment to West Berlin,
stating: "We must meet our oft-stated pledge to the free peoples of West Berlin - and
maintain our rights and their safety, even in the face of force - in order to maintain the
confidence of other free peoples in our word and our resolve. The strength of the alliance
on which our security depends is dependent in turn on our willingness to meet our
commitments to them." The United States promised to protect the people of West Berlin,
and that meant all of West Berlin - including a little place with only 50 people. ro6
The Checkpoint Charlie incident, on the other hand, violates the guidelines Kennedy
set on what issues for which the U.S. would and would not fight. At that point in his
administration, Kennedy had expressed no concern for allied occupation rights in East
Berlin, only West Berlin. In fact, less than two weeks prior to this incident, Kennedy had
warned Clay in a letter against actions that could quickly escalate. Kennedy wrote:
[A]n almost instantaneous resort to force may not be easy to agree with our allies,
and may in fact not be in our own interest. It is not clear that we should deliberately
embark on a series of actions on the ground that would quickly fail if the Soviets
chose to use their full conventional capability, thus facing us ve7c quickly with the
choice between defeat and escalation ... to [using] nuclear weapons. 07
Indeed, when Kennedy learned the morning after the initial incident of the
confrontation at the border, he was far from pleased. He complained that he had not sent
Lightner to Berlin "to go to the opera." One of the "positive-portrayal" historians
Howard Trivers disagreed with Kennedy. He asserted:
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It was and had been for years standing practice for the Allied military and civilian
authorities to show their presence in East Berlin by attendance at the opera, theater,
art exhibitions, city tours, etc; after the Wall it was believed particularly important so
far as the East Berliners were concerned to maintain this policy. General Clay advised
Washington in strong terms that the East German pretensions must not be tolerated
and that we had to meet the issue head-on if we were to maintain our position in
Berlin and our credibility with the Communists. 1 08
Throughout his discussion of the Berlin Crisis, Trivers argues that Washington
officials simply did not understand the reality and precariousness of the everyday
situation in Berlin. He states: "It was exceedingly difficult to make the Kennedy
administration see beyond its abstract preconceptions and come to understand the actual
situation in West Berlin." Smith concurs with his assessment, stating that these officials
were "completely out of touch with the daily situation in Berlin." Smith goes even
further, giving the impression that many in Washington were cowards. He chastises them
for their ''timidity" and states: "Washington, of course, was extremely jittery." 109
There could be another reason why these Washington officials preferred not to take
action in Berlin other than merely being afraid or not grasping the urgency of the
situation in Berlin. Perhaps they better understood what many in Berlin did not - the
issues for which Americans back home would be willing to fight. McGeorge Bundy,
Kennedy's National Security Advisor, makes this point in his work on the Berlin Crisis.
He quotes Kennedy's response when asked whether he could or should have prevented
the wall: "Eastern Berlin and East Germany have been under the control of the Soviet
Union, really, since 1 947 and '48." Bundy then carries the explanation further, stating:
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What [Kennedy] did not add, although it was clear in his mind both before and after
the wall went up, was that he should not use American military strength, conventional
or . nuclear, to challenge that Soviet control. He understood that legally Berlin was a
single occupied city, and also that the circulation of citizens throughout Berlin had
been accepted throughout the postwar years. But these realities, important as they
must be to Berliners, were not matters for which he could ask Americans or their
allies to fight. 1 1 0
Even though the U.S. Mission in Berlin had a legal right to enter East Berlin freely
and with no restrictions from the GDR, enforcing that right becomes much more difficult
if the American people fail to understand or care about this provision. Bundy admits that
"the stakes in West Berlin were real and great" and ''that strong and visible preparations
were required." But such action requires support from the people, and "no such measures
could be taken without setting before the American people a cause to which they could
rally. The freedom of more than two million people reliant on American determination
was such a cause. Freedom of circulation in an already divided city was not." 1 1 1
Furthermore, the East Germans were not preventing allied officials from entering East
Berl� but merely requiring them to present identification to prove they were actually
with the occupational forces. During the Cold War fear of espionage ran strong on both
sides. According to Khrushchev, American U-2 planes had flown into Soviet territory a
number of times, but the Soviets had been unable to shoot down the planes. The Soviets
protested these flights, but the United States denied they took place. Khrushchev grew
increasingly frustrated, and when Soviet forces shot down an American U-2 spy plane
flying over Soviet territory in the spring of 1 960, Khrushchev seized the opportunity to
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expose the American government in a lie. When Khrushchev informed the world that the
Soviet Union had the plane, which had been shot down in Soviet space, the U.S. stated
that the plane accidentally strayed from its course. Then Khrushchev played his trump
card. He announced that the Soviets had captured the plane's pilot who gave the Soviets
the details about his route and mission. 1 1 2
The Warsaw Pact also expressed concern about Western spies in the wake ofthe
Berlin Wali in part as justification for its erection. They issued a statement, blaming the
GDR's economic difficulties and internal political problems on the subversive activities
of the West. The West's spies had provoked disturbances and incited the East
Germans. l l 3
The Soviets and East German Communists grew even more worried upon receiving
reports, as well as photographic evidence, that General Clay intended to knock down the
Berlin Wall. Marshal Ivan Konev, Clay's Soviet counterpart, told Khrushchev that "he
had learned through intelligence channels on what day and at what hour the Western
powers were going to begin their actions against us. They were preparing bulldozers to
break down our border installations [the Wall]. The bulldozers would be followed by
tanks and wave after wave ofjeeps with infantrymen." 1 1 4
In light ofpast espionage and Soviet evidence ofClay's plans, the East German
request for identification appears legitimate, not an unjustified violation ofallied rights.
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Though, again, this was not an allied right for which Kennedy was willing to fight.
Kennedy's focus lay with preserving allied occupation rights in West Berlin - not East.
The actions of Kennedy's administration following the tank crisis demonstrate that
Kennedy disapproved of the stand Clay took at Checkpoint Charlie. Before the tanks
even began to withdraw, Rusk instructed American civilians to refrain from entering East
Berlin for a time. While Kennedy expressed his appreciation to Clay for what he
accomplished, Kennedy's advisers assured the Soviets that Clay had acted without
authorization. British Prime Minister Macmillan sent word to the Soviet embassy in East
Berlin that the Americans would soon remove Clay. 1 1 5
The question arises, then, that if Kennedy disagreed with the stand Clay was taking at
Checkpoint Charlie, why did he not override the general during the standoff? Beschloss
asserts that Kennedy backed General Clay only because he feared provoking him. A
recent article by Mark Haefele throws some doubt on the accuracy of this statement.
Haefele argues that President Kennedy was very concerned with world opinion and used
polling information from the U.S. Information Agency to gauge perception of the U.S. in
the eyes of the world. Haefele contends that Kennedy worried particularly about the
Soviets being perceived as militarily stronger than the U.S., stating "American weakness
anywhere in the world, on any issue, might be the factor that tipped world opinion toward
a belief that communism was ultimately going to be the more durable system." That
being the case, it could be that Kennedy supported Clay during the crisis not because he
was afraid of the trouble the general might cause but because he did not want the world to
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perceive the U.S. as retreating from a strong stance. Now that the U.S. was in this
standoff with the Soviets, they could not back down and appear to give in to GDR
demands. Yet ifClay had not used such a large show ofU.S. military strength, the
United States would not have been in that position in the first place. 1 1 6
During his tenure as President Kennedy's "personal representative in Berlin," Gen.
Lucius clay took some measures that skewed from the direction set by Kennedy in regard
to Berlin. The issue ofidentification at border crossings was not one for which Kennedy
was prepared to use force. The harassment ofallied vehicles and West Berliners were
concerns that required a response by the U.S. However, just because the incidents along
the autobahn and Steinstucken necessitated action does not mean that General Clay took
the correct ones. Even though Clay's efforts may have been justified, he risked
confrontations that could have easily become dangerous and deadly.
It was not enough for General Clay to have an armed convoy ofmilitary vehicles
patrolling the autobahn to prevent the harassment ofAmericans traveling along the route.
He went a step further with retaliatory action, ordering U.S. forces to delay Soviet cars
coming into West Berlin ifthey harassed Americans going into East Berlin. Clay
asserted that he intended for this step "to prove that our presence in Berlin was something
between the United States and the Russians - not the East Germans." Soviet general I van
Konev ordered Ulbricht to stop the harassment entirely because - according to Smyser he did not want the freedom ofhis own soldiers threatened. 1 1 7
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Although preserving American access rights was a necessary stand to take, proving a
point about U.S.-Soviet occupation rights was a rather risky venture. In this instance,
Konev did back down in order to preserve the peace, but the situation could have easily
gone the other way. Fearing Western espionage or an attack on the wall, the Soviets and
East Germans might have felt entirely justified in their behavior toward travelers into
East Berlin. Believing themselves entitled to protect East Berlin, they might have seen
Clay ' s act as an unnecessary provocation and taken their own stand against further
encroachments by the United States. During the Cold War, it was a slippery slope from
protecting one's rights to provoking a major conflict.
General Clay tried to push the envelope again with Steinstucken. His initial plan to
provide assistance to the threatened villagers involved sending two companies of U.S.
troops into the area. They would have to make their way through the barrier erected by
the East Germans. Any movement against the Berlin Wall would have been interpreted
as an act of war. Valentin Falin, later the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, made this point
clear when discussing the "practice wall." He stated that the Soviets would have
retaliated for any move on the wall, which would have pushed the U.S. and Soviet Union
"closer to the third world war than ever ... the events most probably would have gone
beyond any possibility of control." 1 1 8
When Gen. Bruce Clarke, commander of U.S. forces in Europe, discovered this
combustible plan of Clay's for Steinstucken as well as the "practice wall," he
immediately put a stop to it, forcing Clay to devise an alternate scheme. Clay decided to
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go to Steinstucken himself, arriving by helicopter and stationing three military police
personnel there upon his exit. This was a much more suitable course of action. It
established an American presence in the area and demonstrated U.S. commitment to West
Berlin - all of West Berlin. Clay's measures accomplished both ofthese goals without
threatening the wall or the Communists' right to protect it. Had his imprudent act not
been tempered by Clarke's countermands, General Clay might very well have sent U.S.
troops into Steinstucken with the proverbial guns blazing, sparking off a potentially
deadly clash between the two world superpowers. 1 1 9
No one stopped General Clay in his endeavors at Checkpoint Charlie as Clarke did
with Steinstucken. He gave the orders; no one usurped his commands. He had the
support of President Kennedy with whom he spoke by telephone. He told Kennedy that
the United States would lose its credibility throughout the entire world if it "backed down
in the face ofEast German pretensions." Although no war came from Clay's standoff
with the Soviets, the very real danger for hostilities existed with U.S. and Soviet tanks
lined up on either side of the Berlin Wall. General Clay willingly risked turning the Cold
War hot in order to prove his point about Soviet control of East Germany and U.S.
occupation rights in East Berlin - an issue to which President Kennedy never expressed
his commitment. 120
The "positive-portrayal" historians such as Smith and Smyser assert that Clay was
justified in his actions because he proved that the Soviets were really in charge of East
Germany and that GDR claims ofautonomy were lies. Dulles asserts that while some
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people outside of Berlin failed to realize the significance of Clay's achievement, "the
experts, aware of the Four Power legal agreements, knew of the significance of the Soviet
position in the city" and what the return of Soviet tanks to the border represented. These
historians agree with Clay when he stated:
To the outside world it looked like a very exciting thing: ten Russian tanks on one
side of the Wall and a hundred yards away on the American side ten American tanks
laid up, all with their guns pointing directly at one another. But these were Russian
tanks, not East German tanks. It was obvious that the Russians did not trust the East
Germans in this situation. As soon as they did that, I was no longer concerned. The
Russians had come out of hiding, and I was sure they were not going to do anything.
But we had proved our point. The Russians were in charge. We were not going to
have to deal with the East Germans. And that was the whole purpose. 121
The arrival of the Soviet tanks, however, did not necessarily prove that the Soviets
were in charge of East Germany. Khrushchev told Kennedy at the Vienna Conference
that the Soviets would defend the GDR if the U.S. violated its borders, stating that "force
would be met by force." With U.S. tanks with bulldozer attachments on the front of the
equipment stationed directly in front of the Berlin Wall, it could have easily appeared as
though the U.S. intended to make a move against the wall and the GDR. The Soviets had
every right to defend an ally in that situation, whether they controlled the city or not. 1 22
Although Kennedy may have never openly confronted Clay during the tank crisis, he
may have worked behind the scenes to diffuse the situation. Foreshadowing their secret
deal to end the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev appear to have
communicated through back channels to withdraw the tanks. In his memoirs,
Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, Khrushchev states that he ordered the
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Soviet tanks back to allow the Americans to save face, confident that the gesture would
soon be returned. Reeves, Wyden, and Garthoff assert that this conviction came from
assurances from President Kennedy that the U.S. tanks would indeed pull back. Once
again, if cooler heads than that belonging to General Clay had not prevailed, a dangerous
confrontation might have erupted in Berlin. 123
The last step in determining whether General Clay was right or reckless in 1 961 is to
examine the aftermath of Clay' s actions. Despite the strong stance taken by Clay with
the autobahn patrols, Washington discontinued them. Even though Clay believed "it was
a damn foolish thing to stop," no cataclysm befell the United States for this action. The
Communists did not shut down the autobahn or some similar deed. The U.S. made its
point, accomplished its task. There existed no need for further patrols. 1 24
Washington back-pedaled from Clay's strong actions almost immediately after the
Checkpoint Charlie incident in an effort to fix the damage they believed he might have
done to Soviet-American relations. Washington and London made it clear to the Soviets
that they considered Clay more of a renegade than the true representation of Kennedy' s
policies in Berlin. They were not willing to go to the same lengths to fight fo r the same
cause as Clay. Despite the concessions made, the Soviets did not push the matter, did not
renew their call for a peace treaty. The U.S. did not lose its position in the eyes of the
world. West Berliners did not flee the city for fear of Communist action.

Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 459-60; Reeves, President Kennedy, 25 1 ;
Wyden, Wall, 266; Garthoff, "Berlin 1 961 : The Record Corrected," 143-44.
1 24
Smith, Lucius D. Clay, 656.
1 23

71
West Berlin, in fact, enjoyed a boom in its economy. In late January 1 962 U.S. News
& World Report presented the story of Berlin's success. Industrial production was rising,
up 42 percent since 1958, the year Khrushchev first began his ultimatums. There was a
surge of new houses, factories, and workers, and many of the doctors, dentists, and
shopkeepers who had fled to West Germany in August had returned to the city. The
article stated: "Bankers and investment houses report that there has been no significant
flight of capital from West Berlin since the building of the wall." West Berliners had a
great deal of confidence in their city's future, and General Clay had played a large role in
encouraging that progress. The West Berlin Bierstubern gave Clay the most credit for the
West Berliners' boost in morale following the Checkpoint Charlie incident. After the
tank crisis, however, Clay's days in Berlin were numbered. 1 25
In April 1962 President Kennedy recalled his special representative from Berlin.
Although many West Berliners were upset and refused to believe the news was true some even going so far as to accuse "innocent [newspaper] venders of making money on
,
'damned lies, ,., they stayed in Berlin. No great mass of people rushed to safer territory in
West Germany. They still believed they were safe in Berlin. Clay was an important
symbol to the West Berliners, yes, but they did not fear that U.S. commitment to Berlin
would leave with the general. 1 26
General Clay's recall was only one of the concessions made by the U.S. that spring.
The U.S. was willing "to renegotiate on 'access routes' as a distinct and separate problem

1 25

Berlin Now: Life with the Wall," U.S. New & World Report 52 (29 January 1962),
68-69; "Better Now," Time (17 November 1961), 23.
1 26
Joseph Wechsberg, "Letter from Berlin," New Yorker (26 May 1962), 115-16.

72
from the political future ofGermany" when before they insisted on treating them as the
same issue. The U.S. would also give East Germany some "de facto control over allied
traffic," accepting that "East Germany would have to take part in any international
control." Ifthey Soviets were willing to accept these terms, there were even more
concessions the U.S. would consider making. 1 27
Through it all, West Berliners remained in the city. Although they may have hated
the violence ofthe GDR against its own people and worried in later months that the U.S.
would too readily accept the permanent separation ofEast and West Germany, they never
fled in fear ofadvancing Communist aggression. The concessions the U.S. made in
Clay's absence never allowed the Soviets and East Germans to succeed in pushing the
Western allies out ofthe city so that the Communists might overrun it. Many ofthe
''positive-portrayal" historians present General Clay as the lone figure willing to stand up
to the Soviets to prove U.S. commitment to Berlin. Smith and Dulles argue that
Washington officials were indecisive and even fearful ofupsetting the Soviets. Trivers
and Smyser, both ofwhom served in Berlin in 1961-62, assert that the administration
never really understood the gravity ofthe situation and the precariousness ofthe U.S.
position in Berlin as Clay did. Also having been stationed in Berlin, British Minister
Geoffrey McDermott argues that the United States had to stand up to Communist
bullying attempts and encroachments on the West's position in Berlin, and General Clay
was the only one who recognized this problem and took action to solve it. These
historians all suggest that without Clay the U.S. Mission in Berlin would have fallen apart
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and surrendered to Soviet and East German demands, and the U.S. would appear as weak
and cowardly nation in the eyes of the world. Yet this disastrous fate never came to be
once Washington recalled Clay.
It is true that Clay may have indeed worried and even frightened the Communists
enough to convince them to ease their pressure on the West. Newsweek reported that
upon hearing of Clay's imminent departure, ''the Communists were jubilant. 'Clay has
flown away. . . ' gloated East Berlin's Neus Deutschland." By stepping over his bounds,
Clay may have even served an unexpected purpose for Kennedy by intimidating the
Communists. Yet if Clay was the only one keeping the Communists in line, as some of
the "po sitive-portrayal" historians suggest, then it would follow that the Communists
would continue and even increase their encroachments on Western rights once Clay left
Berlin. This would seem even more likely in light of how the U.S. government backed
off of the strong positions taken by Clay - ending the autobahn patrols, General Clarke
destroying the practice wall and refusing Clay the troops for his initial Steinstucken
mission, and ordering Americans in Berlin to refrain from travel in East Berlin after the
tank crisis. Yet Communist aggression against West Berlin and Western rights, for the
most part, remained in check. In mid-February 1 962, the Soviets harassed U.S. air traffic
over Berlin in an apparent attempt to garner acceptance for Soviets sharing the air space
with American planes. General Clay, in his typical fashion of trying to push the situation
farther than it needed to go, wanted fighter planes to accompany American planes
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traveling over Berlin. Instead, the U.S. ignored the harassment, and it soon ended with
no incidents ofviolence. 128
One could argue that the Soviets eased their pressure on Berlin because oftheir plan
to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev was merely biding his time until he
could approach the negotiating table with a much better position. That possibility is
highly probable. However, though not widely known in the U.S. at the time, President
Kennedy ended the Cuban Missile Crisis by making a secret deal with Khrushchev to
remove U.S. missiles from Turkey. In public Kennedy presented himself similarly to
General Clay - he was standing up to Soviet encroachments, forcing Khrushchev to
surrender. In reality, Kennedy made concessions to keep the peace. The world did not
end, and the Cold War continued on in the same stalemate for many more years. 1 29
Just like with the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. needed to take a stand against Soviet
encroachments in Berlin. Kennedy could not allow the Soviets to place missiles so near
U.S. soil, and the U.S. Mission in Berlin could not let the Communists harass autobahn
travelers or Steinstucken villagers. The U.S. had made a commitment to the people of
West Berlin and needed to defend them as well as Western occupation rights. There is a
difference between standing up against an aggressive power and intentionally provoking
a dangerous conflict. Kennedy could have ordered U.S. forces to attack the missile sites
and destroy them. He chose instead to issue a blockade and, later, to make a deal.
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When Gen. Lucius Clay arrived in Berlin in 1 961 , he had a duty to boost the morale
ofWest Berliners and demonstrate U.S. commitment to the city's people. Some ofthe
steps he took to prove that determination were necessary - ending the harassment of
autobahn travelers, protecting the people ofSteinstucken. Other measures went beyond
what the administration was willing to defend - building a "practice wall," storming
through East German territory to the small enclave beyond, lining up tanks and using
military escorts to allow allied travelers into East Berlin without having to show
identification. Clay had good intentions and may have been right in the stands that he
took, but the manner in which he carried them out was often more aggressive that called
for by the situation. Consequently, the "negative-portrayal" historians' perception of
Clay is more valid. Even when General Clay was right, he was still reckless.
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